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letter from the editor
Like many other people I am finding that 2014 is passing very quickly indeed. This is especially so as we 
continue to work to improve PRMIA and also to deliver interesting new thought leadership articles and 
updates via our quarterly PRMIA publication, Intelligent Risk (iRisk).
In the Letter from the Chair our association Chair, Faruk Patel, mentions many completed and upcoming 
initiatives for PRMIA. These include enhancing and refining our C-Suite offering. More evidence of this 
work around C-Suite can be seen in a number of articles in this issue of iRisk, including notes from 
C-Suite events in New York and London. We will continue this work, with more meetings planned in New 
York, London and Asia later this year. We will continue to report on these meetings and the high level and 
important items discussed at them in coming issues of this publication. If you are interested in joining 
PRMIA as a C-Suite Member, you will find details later in this issue.
Apart from PRMIA-centric updates, we have once again included an excellent sample of thought 
leadership articles that will be of great interest to risk practitioners. These include:
Finally, I would like to call your attention to the guidelines for submissions at the end of this issue. PRMIA’s 
Intelligent Risk is accepting submissions from all PRMIA members. If you would like to contribute an article, 
we welcome your submission at: iRisk@prmia.org. 
I hope you will enjoy reading this issue as much as the iRisk team and I have enjoyed preparing it. Please 
continue to read this resource as we advance PRMIA and our risk management community through the 
year 2014 and onwards.
Justin McCarthy
• The first part of a two-part feature on the history of financial derivatives by Hilary Till
• A continuation of a series of articles from Moorad Choudhry
• An excellent article from our issue sponsors, Bloomberg, on the importance of Stress Testing and 
Risk Appetite
• Many more articles on topics such as: correlation, risk culture, human rights & risk and a piece 
on Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) from one of PRMIA’s London chapter, one of our busiest local 
chapters. 
• Last but not least, we have included two Accredited University Profiles, from Université Laval and 
Imperial College London, the newest members of PRMIA’s Accreditation Program
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letter from the chair
Dear PRMIA Volunteers and Members,
As we close another fiscal year, I’d like to reflect back on some of the major strides we’ve made during the 
past year, and let you know about exciting upcoming initiatives.
PRMIA’s goal has always been to serve its members throughout their careers through training and resources, 
certification, networking and membership opportunities.
We’ve celebrated many new initiatives this year, including:
The Board of Directors and PRMIA Staff are eager to continue expanding our offerings to continue 
meeting the needs of members, including:
Faruk Patel
letter from the chair
• Restructuring our individual membership options to better serve our members’ needs;
• Launching and continuing to enhance our website and its offerings;
• Enhancing and refining the C-Suite program to allow for targeted peer-to-peer networking;
• Adding benefits to the Corporate Membership program that offers solutions to meet your 
organization’s needs today and in the future;
• Making it easier for our members to have access to a number of valuable risk resources;
• Hosting the first PRMIA Risk Management Challenge, attracting 340 students from nearly 40 
colleges and universities;
• Conducting a growing number of in-house training courses, bringing PRMIA’s globally-recognized 
training to corporations around the world.
• Exciting new updates to the PRM exam and PRM Handbook;
• Increased benefits for members, with additional networking opportunities, training programs, and 
risk industry resources;
• New certificate offerings, including a certificate in Operational Risk Management;
• Introduction of a continuing professional education (PRM - CRL) credit program;
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Faruk Patel
Chair
On behalf of the Board of Directors:








As your Board Chair, I’m very excited with the progress we’ve made as an organization.  The future is bright, 
and I hope that you’ll join us as we set a higher standard for risk professionals everywhere.
On behalf of the PRMIA Board of Directors (listed below), I remain humbled to serve as your Chair. Please 
continue to support the Association that supports you and your career.
• Second annual PRMIA Risk Management Challenge;
• First-ever Leadership Summit in Chicago in October, 2014 for PRMIA’s leaders to come together 
in person and influence the direction of the organization;
• The expansion of networking opportunities by providing online forums through which members 
can connect and share ideas.
PRMIA Risk Resources
Sustaining Members have exclusive 
access to PRMIA’s latest thought 
leadership research.  
www.prmia.org/risk-resources/category
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PRMIA Spring CRO Summit – New York
Kevin Cuff & Mark Abbott
PRMIA hosts NYC CRO Summit on the major contemporary issues facing sr. risk officers
On June 5 PRMIA hosted nearly 60 NY Chief Risk Officers at Convene Midtown West in NYC for its 
most recent CRO Summit. 
David Ingram, CERA, PRM, Executive Vice President for Willis Re, was the keynote speaker at the 
dinner held the evening before at the Harmonie Club. He opened the Summit with a presentation on 
Risk Culture – Beliefs or Practices. David’s presentation centered around Ten Risk Culture Practices 
and Preliminary List in ERM Beliefs, an article David co-authored as a response to a call for papers by 
the North American CRO Council, where it was among the prize winning submissions. For those who 
are interested, we have included the article in this issue of Intelligent Risk.
The following half-day session was conducted under Chatham House Rule, with full disclosure and 
complete confidence through ease of comment and discussion. Mark Abbott (Guardian Life), Kevin 
M. Cuff (PRMIA) and Bill Spinard (EY) served as ample moderator, host and supporter. The sessions 
moved seamlessly through major challenges facing the contemporary CRO, to the evolving regulatory 
environment, to discussions in emerging risk, to roundtable Hot Topic discussions over lunch.
It was extremely hard to ignore the overwhelming onslaught of regulatory burden that has forced the 
closely merged risk and compliance functions. “Regulation has forged good discipline,” said one 
CRO in reflection to overwhelming demand for Board-led risk culture and in response to regulators 
seemingly interacting with one another (as risk professionals are) trying to explore and explain the 
overall landscape. The multitude of testing and the separation of risk reporting either directly to the 
Board / CEO or through executive session has heightened the critical risk function.
To many in attendance, the evolving role of the CRO has created the overwhelming response to sessions 
such as these. Many of the attending CROs expressed great appreciation for the created environment 
for like-minded professionals to interact on extremely sensitive subject matters. “This is my place to 
interact with colleagues to learn about options, to discuss trends, and to receive validation of what 
I am experiencing,” said a Connecticut-based CRO in response to questions surrounding business 
management in response to regulation.
Thursday, June 5 – Convene Midtown West, NYC
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Finally, PRMIA presented a Risk Management Standards of Practice: A proposed approach, as a 
possibility of developing a prototype to deal with the changing environment. The initiative is designed as a 
developed prototype using all underlying analytical and semantic frameworks to develop recommended 
best practices. Most of the surrounding CRO dialogue (from PRMIA Summits) support many of the 
frameworks and present anecdotal and case management that enhances the framework. 
Julian Fisher and Dan Roberts, the two primary authors of the prototype were on hand to loosely 
present the prototype and to consider much of the conversation as interpretive case management to the 
project. Ultimately, the use of the framework and the use of the Summit conversations help to support 
authoritative sources of risk management guidance through interpretation of key regulatory objectives 
and key industry frameworks.
Nothing outlines this intersection better than a PRMIA CRO Summit – especially in NYC.
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the RWA debate - can RWAs be trusted?
London Events Committee
With the introduction of Basel II, advanced banks have been able to calculate the risk weights used to 
determine their banking book capital requirements utilising their own internal models. More recently, 
concerns have been raised about the accuracy and variability of these risk weights and the models 
used to calculate them. Both the Basel Committee and the European Banking Authority have set up 
workstreams to investigate RWA (Risk Weighted Asset) variability. 
On 17th March 2014 PRMIA London and ISDA brought together some key thinkers in this area to 
discuss this topic. The speakers were:
The session was executed under Chatham House Rule, so no content is attributed to any particular 
panellist and the text is not true to the exact chronological sequence of the discourse. In addition, 
one of the panellists stressed that the views they expressed were not necessarily the views of their 
employer.
This note provides a summary of the discourse that occurred during that event. For brevity, views and 
questions have been paraphrased. The text below is therefore PRMIA London’s interpretation of the 
event proceedings. It does not necessarily reflect PRMIA’s views on the topic nor those of the author.
The event was structured as a panel discussion followed by questions.
• Jas Ellis, Economist, Prudential Policy Division, Bank of England
• Simon Samuels, Managing Director, European Banks Equity Research, Barclays Capital
• Laurie Mayers, Associate Managing Director, EMEA Banking, Moody’s Investors Service
•  Paul Harrald, Group Head, Risk Strategy at Standard Chartered Bank (SCB)
•  Brandon Davies (Moderator), Non-executive Chairman, Premier European Capital Limited 
Advisory Committee, PRMIA London
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background
panel discussion
The panel observed that some 15 years ago, when Basel II was being conceived, many industry specialists 
were very optimistic about its promise and the potential of a risk sensitive regulatory framework. However, 
there is now significant disillusionment within the industry. 
The Basel framework was originally introduced with the 1988 (Basel I) accord. This framework specified 
the minimum amount of equity capital that banks need to have in reserve to fund their assets. Under 
Basel I (and also Basel II), the equity capital held by banks must be at least 8% of their assets where the 
value of those assets is determined on a risk-weighted basis. Under Basel I, risk weights were determined 
using a look-up table. The Basel I framework was updated with the Market Risk Amendment in 1996. This 
amendment allowed banks to use their own internal models to calculate risk-weights for market risk. The 
framework was updated again in 2006 with the introduction of Basel II. Basel II allowed approved banks to 
use their own models to determine the risk weights across their books. 
The latest instalment of the Basel Accord, Basel III, has brought in a number of important changes. These 
include the Liquidity Coverage Ratio, the Net Stable Funding Ratio, the Leverage Ratio and a number of 
additional buffers. However, it was suggested that perhaps the most important change has tightened-up 
the definition of capital, ensuring that this is more able to absorb losses. This change affects the numerator 
of the capital ratio. 
It was observed that now more attention is now being placed on the denominator of the capital ratio, the 
risk-weighted assets:
• Work performed by the UK FSA (Financial Services Authority) and Simon Samuels of Barclays 
Investment Bank (on the panel) highlighted differences in risk weights between banks several 
years ago. 
•  The Basel Committee more recently launched a project to assess the variability of risk weights 
across international banks. The Basel work addressed both the trading and banking books. The 
work on the Banking Book was divided into three parts:
 º A hypothetical portfolio exercise where PDs and LGDs were obtained from banks for 
named exposures.
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The hypothetical portfolio exercise focused on larger exposures (sovereign, bank and large 
corporate). These are co-rated by many banks and so are suitable for cross-comparisons. The 
aggregate observed variation, measured by comparing capital ratios, was about 1.5 times. 
However, the variation on individual portfolios was much larger at as much as 13 times. 
where does the variation come from?
The Basel study observed that, in general, banks are fairly consistent in the way they rank order exposures, 
but PDs and LGDs are much less consistent, and areas such as differences in regulatory approach 
(the portion of assets on Standardised), the treatment of defaulted assets and the portfolio mix strongly 
contribute to the variance. 
It was pointed out that variation in risk weights due to portfolio mix is to be expected as banks will invest 
in different assets. 
The panel observed that supervisory practices also lead to risk weight variation; some supervisors top-
up underestimation of RWAs in Pillar 1, others in Pillar 2. There are also different ways that regulators 
determine capital requirement increases; for example, stress tests are a bottom-up approach while top-ups 
and buffers are more top-down. 
The panel noted that regulators have also increased capital requirements due to non-credit concerns; for 
example FINMA has been talking to UBS and Credit Suisse about additional capital requirements for litigation 
risk. In the UK, the FPC required banks to raise additional capital as part of its headwinds exercise; this 
additional capital requirement was not broken down so analysts could not determine contributing factors. 
In addition, different regulators have moved at different paces when implementing regulation; Europe and 
the US did not implement Basel II at the same time. 
It was observed that when looking across institutions, RWA variability is also reflected in management 
practices. Such practices include: the use of netting agreements, the pace of movement of assets onto 
IRB, and increasing the scope of models.
1 / The comments within the discussion focused on primarily on the banking book work.
 º  A top-down analysis looking at aggregate information collected by supervisors.
 º  Interviews with banks to survey bank and regulatory practices.
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why do we care about risk weight variation?
what is being done to address the issues?
The panel noted that RWA variability creates problems for rating analysts and the rating agencies when 
performing analyses, providing recommendations and ratings:
From a global perspective, the following remarks were made by Stefan Ingves (Chairman of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision) and repeated within the discussion:
“We will need a series of policy and supervisory changes, along the following lines: 
•  Rating agencies like to look at issuers on a comparable basis and a common tool is to create 
peer groups. These are often based around analyses of quantitative metrics (e.g. return on 
RWAs). If values used in these metrics are determined on different bases by different banks, then 
it is difficult to create consistent metrics that can be compared across banks. 
•  Assessing capital adequacy is difficult – there is a need to understand the capital available above 
the regulatory minimum. As Pillar 2A capital requirements are not disclosed this is complicated.
•  From an investor perspective, RWA variability creates a mistrust in bank disclosures. When 
comparing two banks, say bank A and bank B, if bank A has higher risk weights for no apparent 
reason, some investors will conclude that bank A is more conservative and bank B less 
trustworthy. 
• Most immediately, there will be supervisory action. Our studies have provided supervisors with 
a clearer picture of how their banks stack up against their international peers, and supervisory 
action is already being taken against a number of the outlier banks that are on the low side. 
•  Similarly, the Committee’s RCAP (Regulatory Consistency Assessment Program) work is helping 
to reduce variability due to undesirable differences in national regulations, thereby improving the 
consistency of outcomes. The Committee is also looking at the issue of national discretions 
and Pillar 2, and it is investigating whether more can be done to reduce variability from these 
sources. 
• Since a lack of transparency in bank modelling practices lies at the heart of the problem, the 
Committee will propose enhancements to Pillar 3 in the first half of this year.
‘‘
011Intelligent Risk - August, 2014 
•  At the heart of this problem is a question of whether, for regulatory purposes, banks have too 
much freedom in their modelling choices, so we are looking at whether, and how far, greater 
constraints on the modelling practices of banks are needed. 
• To make a more direct impact, we are also examining the role of floors and benchmarks within 
the regulatory framework, and considering whether they should have a greater role to play.
Finally, we now have the leverage ratio as a backstop to the risk-based regime. And the case 
for a leverage ratio will only grow stronger if risk-weight variability is not adequately dealt with.”
It was noted that the Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee has also focused on this area. Actions 
include a recommendation that UK banks follow the disclosure requirements of the FSB’s Enhanced 
Disclosure Task Force and the execution of a feasibility study to assess the additional cost banks would 
incur if they were required to report Standardised risk-weights in addition to IRB ones.
what do the panellists think should be done?
The panel suggested that either the framework should be maintained roughly as-is or replaced with 
something radically different. If the framework is maintained as-is it will need a strong defence and potentially 
to be made more risk sensitive. It was stated that the current framework is simplistic, at least from some 
perspectives; for example, it provides no rewards for geographic diversification. 
It was argued that it is reasonable that banks should have different PDs for the same asset, as each bank 
will manage its assets differently, and risk appetite and the current state of the cycle need to be considered 
when assessing PDs. This means that there is a need to refer to internal data when making comparisons 
across banks and better disclosure is required; banks should be asked to disclose default rates against 
credit scores to facilitate a clearer understanding, and there should additionally be comparisons against risk 
sensitive benchmarks. Hypothetical portfolio exercises should refer to internal data. 
It was suggested that additional capital should be added to Pillar II capital as opposed to Pillar I as otherwise 
systemic risk is created. 
Concerns about the leverage ratio were raised. It was observed that in the US the leverage ratio has played 
a more prominent role in regulation than in Europe. It was argued that this has resulted in an increased 
prominence of Government Sponsored Enterprises, in particular: Freddie Mae and Freddie Mac (up until 
the crisis), greater use of the securitisation and bond markets as the leverage ratio makes it unprofitable for 
banks to lend to low risk entities or individuals.
The panel suggested that any framework should be assessed against the incentives it creates. There is a 
danger if a single measure is used as the banks’ management teams will focus on this; there needs to be 
a range of measures.
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human rights are now a material risk1 
by Olivier Jaeggi
When preparing the first issue of the ECOFACT Quarterly2 this year, our team had a discussion about 
what we considered last year’s most important development in the environmental and social risk arena. 
The winner was the traction that human rights norms have gained.
Since the UN Guiding Principles on Human Rights and Business3 (Guiding Principles) were endorsed 
in 2011, there has been an ongoing discussion about the potential implications for the financial sector. 
In 2013, three developments altered the pace of that discussion:
• The National Contact Points4 of the Netherlands and Norway ruled that the OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises also apply to minority shareholders. Minority shareholders are 
expected to engage in human rights due diligence before making investment decisions. 
This sets a precedent for what is expected from investors. In addition, it is reasonable to 
assume that this requirement also applies to other types of transactions, such as lending or 
underwriting.
•  The Thun Group of Banks (Thun Group) published a discussion paper5 which aimed to tailor 
the key requirements of the Guiding Principles to the financial sector.
•  In the UK, an amended Companies Act6 requires the directors of listed companies to 
include information about human rights issues in their annual strategic report. The strategic 
report must also include information about the company’s corresponding policies and their 
effectiveness. If the report does not cover these issues, it must state those which it does not 
contain.
1 / This article is derived from a longer article which appeared on the Sustainability Blog of the MIT Sloan Management Review: “Human Rights: The Next 
Frontier”; April 15, 2014
2 / The ECOFACT Quarterly (ecofact.com/EQ) is a briefing tailored to the needs of individuals and teams in charge of assessing environmental, social, and 
reputational risks in banking and commercial insurance.
3 / Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises; 
John Ruggie / “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework”; March 21, 2011
4 / The implementation of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises is supported by a unique mechanism of National Contact Points (NCPs). The final 
statements on this case were issued by the NCP of Norway in May 2013, and the NCP of the Netherlands in September 2013.
5 / The Thun Group of Banks, “UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights / Discussion Paper for Banks on Implications of Principles 16 – 21”; October 
2013; supplemented by a statement signed by Barclays, BBVA, Credit Suisse, ING Bank, RBS, UBS, and UniCredit.
6 / Parliament of the United Kingdom, “The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report), Regulations 2013”; October 1, 2013
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The Guiding Principles are difficult to operationalize, in particular because they brought about a paradigm 
shift in that companies must now aim higher than simply mitigating their own risks7. In the financial sector, 
this means that a financial institution is expected to at least try to exert its influence on a client that infringes 
human rights, and not simply step away.
From a risk management perspective, it does not matter what the legal status of the Guiding Principles is 
today. What matters is the traction they have gained and how they will shape regulation in the future. The 
Guiding Principles have already influenced many standards and guidelines which are relevant to businesses8.
Consequently, it may be wise to work on the assumption that the Guiding Principles already provide 
binding guidance. The Principles make it very clear that the duty of private-sector companies to respect 
human rights is an active responsibility. Ignoring these expectations today might, in retrospect, be seen 
as a deliberate decision which will eventually expose a financial institution to risk. Directors and executives 
should make sure that their financial institution conducts a strategic assessment of its human rights risks, 
and implements appropriate human rights due diligence processes where necessary.
Still, it is important to remain realistic about what a financial institution can achieve. Financial institutions 
can take a risk-based approach to prioritize which human rights risks to address first. Also, they do not 
need to prevent or mitigate adverse impacts alone. Promising strategies might involve partnering with other 
institutions on challenging issues or in individual client relationships.
7 / According to the commentary on principle 17, “human rights due diligence (…) goes beyond simply identifying and managing material risks to the company 
itself (…).” According to principle 19, if the company “is unable to increase its leverage”, it “should consider ending the relationship (…).”
8 / The most important of these include the OECD Guidelines discussed above, the renewed EU Strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility, including 
the related action plans of the EU member states, and the latest release of the Equator Principles.
author
Managing Partner / Chairman, ECOFACT
Olivier Jaeggi
Prior to founding ECOFACT in 1998, Olivier Jaeggi worked in UBS’s credit risk 
control where he was in charge of managing environmental risks. He graduated 
in environmental engineering from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) 
Zurich, and completed executive education programs at Harvard Business School 
and at the University of Oxford. He is a member of PRMIA’s subject matter expert 
advisory group on reputational risk and, since 2012, contributes to the annual 
sustainability report produced by the MIT Sloan Management Review in collaboration 
with the Boston Consulting Group. He is also a regular contributor to the sustainability blog of the MIT Sloan 
Management Review.
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by Adam Litke
risk appetite and stress testing
When the board of a firm determines how much capital to hold they are trying to satisfy several different 
constituencies.  Regulators set minimum levels of capital which they think are sufficient to pay back 
protected classes of liability and to allow the orderly unwinding of the firm. Rating agencies set minimum 
levels of capital to obtain a given rating which, in turn, has a direct impact on funding costs. Finally, 
equity holders want the amount of capital to be low enough to allow them to earn a decent return on 
their investments without losing control of the company. It is interesting to note that shareholders have 
no interest in how much money is lost once the equity layer is wiped out. Protection of senior liability 
holders is provided only to obtain better funding rates or satisfy regulations.
Investors are in the same position as corporate boards. The money that they have invested is usually 
set aside for a specific purpose such as paying pensions or maintaining the spending power of 
endowments. Just like boards, they have conflicting goals. On the one hand, they must preserve capital 
– possibly adjusted for inflation. On the other hand they want to maximize long term spending power 
or ensure that plan sponsors do not have to make more contributions to the fund.
The fundamental question that we must ask when determining risk appetite can be phrased in one of 
two ways:
Or
Under what circumstances are we willing to let the firm go under, the pension fund turn insolvent, or the 
endowment lose its purchasing power?
How much excess capital do we want to hold so that after a bad event which cripples most of our 
competition, we can continue to write business at highly profitable levels when they are paralyzed? How 
do we ensure that we have dry powder for investing when the markets are under stress and there are 
buying opportunities? How do we ensure that we can meet our spending needs in tough times without 
destroying future purchasing power?
who are the stakeholders and what do they expect?
asking the question
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The key idea in both of these questions is event. Models and their associated confidence levels can be 
used to help understand the variability of returns. They are useful for aggregating risks across disparate 
portfolios. They may even be useful for obtaining a basic understanding of portfolio behavior in extreme 
events. What models cannot do is determine what these events are. It makes little sense to talk about 
holding capital at some multiple of 99 percent VaR or at the 99.90 percent confidence interval for credit 
losses over the next year. In addition to the false comfort of relying on extrapolation from a limited data set 
these numbers do not necessarily correspond to events that mean something. 
So what should our capital stewards do? Stress scenarios should start with reasonable worst cases for 
the risk factors underlying the firm’s portfolio. For banks and other investment firms, including pension 
funds and endowments, this would include severe bear markets with no asset liquidity, negative GDP 
growth, unemployment spikes and concomitant default levels for loans. For insurance companies this 
would include extreme loss events in each significant portion of the portfolio with some consideration for 
supposedly uncorrelated events happening at the same time. Any time somebody says something like 
“This happened in the past but it cannot happen again” or “This happened in that other country but it can’t 
happen here” it is a good bet that all of the appropriate events have not been considered. The numbers 
that come out of these scenarios may be higher or lower than those that come out of the models but they 
are an indispensable reality check on the way the business is managed. 
There are some events that an institution cannot hope to survive and are implicit in the business model. 
The most obvious of these is home country default. This is the main reason behind allowing banks to hold 
home country sovereign debt denominated in local currency at a zero risk weighting. The government of 
the home country has ultimate control over any assets that are held within its borders. While we like to think 
of the laws governing financial assets as being stable, the decisions made by a country that is in economic 
distress are fundamentally political ones. If the rulers of the country decide that nationalization of assets 
is in their best political interest, local banks will be vulnerable to default. If a city or state can no longer 
pay its obligations a bankruptcy court can rewrite the rules governing which creditors get paid first. When 
determining risk appetite, we must remember that there is no point in holding capital against those events 
where capital does not provide a defense.
The scenarios we have been discussing are stress tests, and the first thing we need to do when creating 
a stress test is to make sure that it is both bad and plausible. Then we need to turn our scenario into the 
parameters that drive our portfolio. There are several steps to this process. 
the answer is stress tests
parameterization
• Make a list of scenarios you should be worried about. There are two issues that need to be 
considered. What are the large concentrations of risk, no matter how benign they may seem, in 
your portfolio? Under which scenarios do you expect to fail? 
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Risk is not linear. We begin with the notion that knowing how much you lose in a stress test is not enough 
to manage risk. This can be seen in a simple example from the mortgage book. Let’s say that a bank 
makes a mortgage loan on a $1 million house with a 20 percent down payment. Now, assume that the 
borrower defaults. As long as the house is worth at least $800,000 (net of foreclosure costs) the bank 
gets its principal back and doesn’t incur a loss. If the house is worth less than $800,000, then the bank 
suddenly begins to lose money one-for-one with the value of the house. Remember that the value of the 
house may be a leveraged bet on the economy. For employment and, therefore, home prices there is a 
bigger difference between a change in GDP from 0 percent growth to -1 percent growth than there is from 1 
percent growth to 0 percent growth. This means that the losses on the loan can accelerate as the economy 
gets worse. In a crisis, these losses can be highly non-linear. A bank can go from no losses to moderate 
losses to extreme losses. This is why many banks found their loan-loss forecasts falling off a cliff as the 
housing crisis worsened in early 2008. As the economy moved past critical levels, defaults skyrocketed, 
housing price depreciation accelerated and loan portfolios collapsed.
These types of losses are common in financial portfolios. While equity portfolios are linear, option portfolios 
are highly non-linear and credit portfolios are nothing more than out-of-the-money options, which don’t 
render a loss because their strike price is away from the underlying security’s price. The accelerating losses 
in our housing scenario are fundamentally the same as a short gamma position in an option, where exposure 
becomes larger as the price of the underlying asset decreases. The only linear instruments that banks hold 
in significant amounts are government bonds and those are only linear because banks default long before 
their home countries’ default. This is Taleb’s1 notion of fragility in a portfolio. It can appear to be robust under 
reasonably large moves, but beyond a certain point the losses can accelerate. An anti-fragile portfolio is 
one that has decelerating losses in the tail. This is not about convexity or gamma in the traditional sense as 
these are concerned with risk in current market conditions; it is about negative convexity in the tails.
robust stress testing
•  Convert these stories into parameters. This may be as simple as turning to the parameters in a 
risk model and rerunning a past event. We see this when banks replay the 1987 stock market 
crash or the 2007-8 market collapse. Insurance companies often replay specific catastrophes, 
such as a severe hurricane, against their current portfolio. It can be more difficult if the event has 
not yet occurred. Then the best defense is to look at other markets. Even if the US stock market 
has never stayed down for a 30 year period, it doesn’t mean that other markets haven’t. Any long 
term US equity investor should, at a minimum, run a scenario on the US market corresponding 
to Japanese stock market data from 1990 to 2014. It may not be a highly probable event, but it 
should factor into risk appetite.
1 /   http://www.riosmauricio.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Taleb_Antifragile.pdf
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In the end a stress test tells us what we can lose in a very specific scenario. A well designed stress test 
can also tell you if you have risk hidden in the tails. In order to be useful there needs to be a continuous 
feedback loop between stress testing and stories. Risk appetite is all about being able to say what you 
think will happen to your portfolio in a bad event. Since no stress test is perfect, actual exposures need to 
be set a good deal below the level of failure, but failure should always be an option. Nobody who invests 
in a BB rated company expects the same level of safety as they do in an AAA rated company. They do 
expect a commensurate increase in returns. Good stress testing lets the risk takers explain to the true risk 
owners what their downside is in simple language. Imagine how much easier it would have been for banks 
to manage through 2008 or the Eurozone crisis if they had thought about a collapse in advance rather than 
simply stating that these events were outside the tail of their risk measurments
from stress testing back to risk appetite
We can capture non-linear effects by taking our original stress test and create two additional tests on top of 
it. Let’s assume that the stress is a 20 percent fall in housing prices. Then our two new stresses will be a 21 
percent and a 22 percent decline. If the difference between the 22 percent and 21 percent stress scenario 
is larger than the difference between the 21 percent and 20 percent stress scenario then we know that it 
is insufficient to describe the risk in the bank’s portfolio. This is because losses are accelerating after the 
stress event. 
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The most important function that a bank’s Board and senior executive can undertake is to set the firm’s 
strategy. It is vital that banks put in place a coherent, articulated strategy that sets the tone for the entire 
business, from the top down. 
In the first instance the Board must take into account the current regulatory environment and the 
bank’s own capital, liquidity and human capital constraints. This includes of course the requirements 
of Basel III, as well as any specific requirements of the national regulator. A bank cannot formulate 
strategy without a clear and genuine understanding of the environment in which it operates. Once this is 
achieved, before proceeding with a formal strategy the bank needs to determine what markets it should 
operate in based on the resources it possesses, what products it sells and what class of customer it 
wishes to serve. Individual business lines should be set up to operate within the main strategy. In other 
words, all the business lines exist as ingredients of the strategy. If a business line is not a fit with the 
strategy, it should be divested; equally, if a bank wishes to enter into new business, the strategy should 
be reviewed and realigned if it does not naturally suggest the new business. This sounds obvious, but 
there are many cases of banks entering piecemeal into different businesses, or maintaining unsuitable 
lines that have been inherited through previous growth or acquisition. 
The first task then is to understand one’s operating environment. It is then to incorporate a specific 
target market and product suite as the basis of its strategy, after taking into account what resources are 
currently in place and, if these are insufficient, what additional resources are needed before embarking 
on the strategy. Concurrent with this, the bank must set its Return on Capital (RoC) and Return on 
Risk-Weighted Assets (RoRWA) targets, the level of which will influence much of the bank’s culture and 
ethos. A realistic RoC target is one that is sustainable over the entire business cycle. 
Concurrently with the above process, a bank must ask itself where its strength lies and formulate its 
strategy around that. In other words, it is important to focus on core competencies. The experience 
of the crash showed that many banks found themselves with balance sheet risk exposures that they 
did not realise they had. This may have been simply the holding of assets (such as structured finance 
securities) whose credit exposures, valuation and secondary market liquidity they did not understand, 
or otherwise embarking on investment strategies such as cash-synthetic negative basis trading without 
being aware of all the risk measurement parameters of such strategies. To properly implement a 
coherent, articulate strategy, a bank needs to be aware of exactly what it does and does not have an 
expertise for undertaking, and not operate in products or markets in which it has no genuine knowledge 
base.
by Moorad Choudhry 
future bank strategy: fewer choices, tougher calls
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What returns do
 investors / employees 
require




Which market with 
which products?
In this article we consider the various strategy alternatives for commercial banks and their feasibility: as we 
will see, the choice is limited for all but the largest or the most nimble firms. Furthermore, none of them is 
any easier to implement than the other. 
The competitive environment for banks remains extremely tough. The issue is even more challenging for 
banks domiciled in countries that experienced a sovereign bail-out, where there is additional pressure 
associated with continuing poor public image and brand association. Under such circumstances it is 
unsurprising that differentiating oneself from the competition presents difficulties for bank Boards and senior 
management, particularly when one considers the commoditised nature of the basic bank product.
Figures 1A and 1B are a summary of the change in strategy-setting culture that was demanded as a result 
of the crash. The cycle is now resource-constraint driven, and anti-clockwise on our diagram, compared to 
the clockwise process that was heavily influenced by return target in the pre-crash era.
specific strategy choices
Pre-crash Post-crash
• Capital finite but available
• Funding finite but available









• Capital more expensive and limited
• Funding now driven by regulatory requirements
• Resource base constraints drives strategy
What returns does 
strategy generate?
Resources needed for 
product-market plan
Decide on optimum 
financial structure




• Human capital expertise
• Infrastructure
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strategy and outperformance
All banks are aware of universal strategic imperatives in the wake of the crash and the Basel III regulatory 
regime. These are summarised as follows:
Of course the first three are essentially platitudes – all businesses would seek to maximise capital efficiency 
and minimise the cost-income ratio at all times, simply as good operating practice. To be considered a 
genuine long-term contender in banking requires more than this in fact: no less than a specific defined 
customer-orientated differentiation of one’s business model. 
The overwhelming majority of retail and corporate customer banking requirements can be met with simple 
deposit and loan products. The plain vanilla nature of bank products makes brand differentiation not a 
straightforward process, and requires that banks place a great emphasis on customer service. This fact, 
together with traditional high barriers to entry, limits the strategy choices available to both established and 
new challenger banks. We summarise below six distinct strategic paths that a bank might consider.
• To improve capital efficiency via existing loan book restructuring and “optimising” collateral 
management
• To investigate “capital-light” growth opportunities within existing knowledge and resource base;
• To lower costs via a combination of simplifying operating models, headcount reduction, out-
sourcing or disposing of unprofitable or non-core business lines;
• To implement more robust and stable funding structures, particularly with respect to higher-cost 
longer-term funds. 
• Global integrated multinational: our first strategy choice is, in fact, hardly any choice at all. The 
barriers to entry to a bank electing this option are so considerable as to make this strategy unfeasible 
for virtually all banks that are not already in this space. Outside of a handful of names such as HSBC, 
Citibank and Bank of America it is difficult to think of any institution that would consider this strategy 
today, realistically, particularly in the wake of the more stringent capital and liquidity requirements of 
Basel III. Unless a bank derives a significant share of its revenue from outside home markets, say at 
least 35% - 40%, it is not credible for banks to adopt this approach. 
• Basic banking: this approach concentrates on delivering simple product with maximum efficiency. 
The key metrics to follow are customer satisfaction (or, customer complaints volume) and cost-
income ratio. Adopting this strategy is only feasible if the bank exhibits, or plans to exhibit, a below-
average cost base compared to its peers. Almost by definition, such banks would run low balance 
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• Specialist customer base: a bank adopting this strategy will target a specific customer franchise, in 
essence those customers that are willing to pay a premium in return for a more “modern” banking 
experience. This would include products with a dynamic image and a leading edge digital and mobile 
platform. Note that such a customer base does not exist in every jurisdiction; it is also more of a 
retail rather than corporate customer base. While we emphasise the importance of strong customer 
service at all banks irrespective of their strategy, this particular approach requires a markedly superior 
reputation for truly excellent customer care, if it is to succeed as a strategy – the difference has to be 
such that customers are happy to pay the cost premium involved. As important is the cultural ethos 
in place at the bank, treating every customer as a special relationship in which all their financial needs 
are met from one source. 
• Market growth strategy: fast-growing economies are able to support banks that adopt a market-
growth strategy. Almost by definition it suits more those banks that are early entrants and thus able 
to help shape the country’s financial system. Later entrants can still apply this approach but will need 
to demonstrate creativity and innovation as they also seek to influence the market’s development. 
Domestic banks may have an advantage in that they “know your customer” better than foreign banks; 
multinational banks need to ensure they are familiar with the customer base if they are to adopt this 
strategy for their local branch or subsidiary. This strategy is more realistic in those countries that have 
a comparatively faster growing economy than more mature economies, such as certain regions of 
Asia-Pacific and the Arabian Gulf.
• Private banking: an alternative approach to mainstream banking is to concentrate on high net worth 
customers and target this franchise. As such this strategy is a sub-set of the specific customer base 
approach described earlier; however, it is more specialist – it demands a capital- and funding-light 
balance sheet model, and one in which returns are generated more from wealth management and 
asset management activities than mainstream banking. In fact, for this to be a realistic and distinct 
strategy the bank would have to derive over 60% of its revenues from such activities, and most likely 
outsource more traditional banking operations such as ATMs and cheque clearing to other banks. It 
would concentrate on efficient capital/asset and revenue/asset ratios, and be funded exclusively by 
customer deposits. Larger banks may choose to set up a separately branded arm specifically so as 
to incorporate this strategy for part of their revenue base.
sheet risk exposure compared to other banks, but the key to competitive advantage is in keeping 
costs low – and by responding to mass customer desire for simple, easy-to-understand products. 
By running a low cost operation, a bank following this strategy can supply low-cost products. At 
the same time, the bank would need to adopt a conservative credit origination policy, to maintain 
relatively low risk exposure on the balance sheet and also to ensure that it understood fully the credit 
and market risks it was running. 
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• Hybrid strategy: this strategy combines two or more of the above strategies but presents a 
greater challenge in implementation and delivery because of the need to excel in all selected 
fields. This applies equally to the need to control costs. That said, it may be the logical choice for 
comparatively larger institutions that currently offer a full service product across all customer types 
but are struggling to deliver shareholder value in some or all of their customer proposition. For 
example, a bank may elect both the “back-to-basics” strategy but at the same time develop and 
enhance a niche or boutique business arm – perhaps with its own brand – that delivers a private 
banking or asset management service. 
This list is not claimed to be the complete universe of possible strategic direction for all banks. Equally, 
there is always scope for an approach that is more tailored, or perhaps simply a hybrid one as we suggest 
above, for specific individual banks. But it does present almost the complete range of distinct strategy 
types that are available. This should not come as a surprise: as we note at the start, financial services are a 
commoditised product. There are only so many ways one can seek to deliver them well, consistently, and 
at the same time also differentiate one’s brand and customer offering. 
Irrespective of the strategy selected and the customer franchise targeted, some requirements are universal. 
All banks will need to invest capital and resource into enhancing their digital capability. Internet and mobile 
technology are paramount because of customer demand for them and must be delivered with efficiency. 
This is the one area where the barrier to entry for new banks is less of an issue; established banks, 
particularly large banks and/or banks that have grown through acquisition, suffer from legacy systems 
and data management platforms that do not necessarily lend themselves to modification or enhancement. 
Challenger banks at least have the luxury of being able to develop new systems that are fit-for-purpose, 
albeit at cost. All the strategies, with the exception perhaps of the global multinational approach, require 
high quality data analysis ability and interface skills that integrate the physical (branch) and digital channels, 
to the benefit of all customers. The benchmark for banks is companies such as Amazon or Google, which 
have a customer-orientated data management and analytics capability that is highly efficient. 
The other universal is customer service. Simply selecting and attempting to implement a strategy is no 
guarantee of success or outperformance. In essence, a bank needs to make every one of its customers 
feel as if he or she is the only customer it has. This is perhaps less of an issue in the Basic Banking model, 
where customers’ expectations will be slightly lower, but all of the strategies demand exceptional customer 
service. For certain strategy options such as specific customer franchise this will require heavy investment 
in staff technical and service skills, but every bank will need to pay close attention to this requirement. The 
emphasis on customer care, and the staff training requirements that this will drive, is paramount. 
In effect, banking culture needs to move to that of a service one. Culture is set from the top and it is 
concierge banking
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Strategy selection is, of course, only the start. In any case, the options are limited. Notwithstanding that, we 
have outlined six distinct strategies; the reality for most banks is that only 2 or 3 of them present a feasible 
course of action. For example, the market growth approach is dependant on the state of the economy, 
and non-domestic banks with no existing presence in-country would struggle with it. The capital- and 
funding-light private bank or asset management strategy would involve a fundamental change of operating 
model for banks that are not already involved, to a significant degree, in this business. And the multinational 
integrated bank strategy presents simply too high a barrier to entry for banks that are not, already, large 
universal banks.
This leaves essentially two paths: the “basic bank” strategy that emphasises tight control of costs, or the more 
“up market” approach that targets a more sophisticated customer franchise and product base. The latter 
also requires genuine brand, service and product differentiation if it is to succeed. Both approaches require 
exceptional, or at least above peer-group average, levels of customer service. For larger banks, adopting 
either strategy will require substantial cost-cutting and possibly divestment of “non-core” businesses. 
The hybrid strategy is in our list precisely because many larger banks will not be nimble enough to adopt 
one focused approach but will nevertheless be too small to adopt the universal strategy. Instead they 
will take the perceived “easy option” of a combined strategy. This can still be a winning course of action; 
however, it requires a knowledgeable and intellectually strong senior executive. It is not uncommon for 
larger banks to wish to offer a “one stop shop” for all customers ranging from retail to SMEs and larger 
corporates. The big danger is that the bank provides an average service for all customers. To make this 
strategy work, middle management must be cut to a minimum and the line of control from senior executive 
to operating businesses must be clear and transparent. Otherwise the bank will drift and become a jack-of-
all-trades and master of none. In a crowded field, this could prove fatal.
delivering on the strategy
essential that senior management drive change through personal example. The author’s own term is 
“Concierge Banking”, the qualitative philosophy that states that each and every interaction with every 
customer, however large or small, must be treated as if the future of the company depends on it. This is a 
skillset that must be taught by example, from the top downwards. The way that senior executives deal with 
their subordinates, and they in turn with theirs, is crucial to inculcating this cultural skillset. The way a team 
operates in a bank will help drive this cultural change. “Total banking” demands that every member of a 
team can cover for everyone else (to an extent, but certainly amongst peers), are open and honest in their 
interaction with each other without fear of impact on career progression, and enthusiastic about assisting 
each other in their daily tasks. This creates a genuine team enviromment.
Each customer must be made to feel as if it is the bank’s only customer. Adopting a concierge banking 
approach is the key to success.
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Selecting a defined, and definite, strategy is the first step to becoming a more focused financial institution. 
As we noted earlier, for the majority of banks the choice is limited to at most 2 or 3 distinct approaches. 
And irrespective of the strategy path embarked upon, the need to deliver first-class customer service is 
paramount. Another universal is the need to have efficient technology platforms, to simplify products, and 
to narrow the product range. Every bank would testify to the popularity of this action in the past with both 
retail and corporate customers. This also benefits the bank’s risk management function: a simpler product 
range generates less exotic and more “vanilla” risk exposure on the balance sheet, which is easier to 
understand and mitigate.
The shift to a high-class customer service culture is the key to success. This requires investment in staff 
training, both technical and qualitative, especially for customer-facing teams. But customer service is more 
than simply having senior executives spouting platitudes, it is a change in internal environment to one that 
is genuine and open. A working culture free of politics and bureaucracy creates naturally an ethos of caring 




1. Parts of this chapter are extracted from Professor Choudhry’s book The Principles 
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The emergence and development of financial derivatives post 
Bretton Woods
by Hilary Till
the history of financial derivatives, a 2-part feature
This 2-part series discusses the emergence of financial derivatives after the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods accord in 1971. In Part 1, the article explains the concepts that enabled financial derivatives 
markets to flourish, focusing on the required mathematical concepts. Part 2 continues with enumerating 
the business models that have been employed by successful commercial participants in the financial 
derivatives arena. Part 2 also briefly covers the development of over-the-counter financial derivatives, 
including their misuse during the lead-up to the Global Financial Crisis. The article concludes with the 
possibility that we may be nearing the limits of what the power of mathematics can do to hedge, and 
thereby conquer, financial risk. 
Examining the history of currency arrangements, in “the summer of 1944, delegates from 44 countries 
met in the midst of World War II [at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire] to reshape the world’s international 
financial system,” recounted Schifferes (2008). At this conference, John Maynard Keynes unsuccessfully 
floated the idea of an alternative post-war currency, the “Bancor,” which was to be anchored by 30 
commodities, a broader base than the Gold Standard. Instead, noted Conte and Karr (2001), “the 
leaders decided to tie world currencies to the dollar, which, in turn, they agreed should be convertible 
into gold at $35 per ounce.” This created a modified gold standard. Therefore, when the Bretton Woods 
system functioned, there was no pressing economic need for derivatives to hedge currency risk.
Post-World War II, Essentially the Gold Standard: No Need for Hedging
abstract
the emergence of financial derivatives post-bretton woods
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historical relationship between gold and oil
figure 01
“In 1971, the US … unilaterally went off the gold standard and devalued the dollar … This led to the 
abandonment of fixed exchange rates and the introduction of floating rates, where the value of all the main 
currencies was determined by market trading,” explained Schifferes (2008).
With the U.S. dollar no longer pegged to gold or anything of fixed value, the risk of large price changes 
entered the markets. As reviewed by Leo Melamed, Chairman Emeritus of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
in Melamed (1994), “the collapse of the Bretton Woods Agreement … ushered in an era of considerable risk 
in currency price fluctuation – risks which could be limited if there were a viable market for currency futures 
trading.” As a result, the Chicago futures exchanges developed innovative financial hedging instruments in 
both currencies and interest rates in the 1970s and 1980s.
Arguably, outside of the United States, there was a different response to floating exchange rates. According 
to Hammes and Wills (2005), from the end of WWII through late 1971, “10 [to] 15 barrels of oil would buy 
an ounce of gold. … [This] situation changed [temporarily] … in the early 1970s.” That said, this long-
term relationship appears to have regained its validity, even though the dollar price of oil has had wide 
fluctuations since the 1970s. Please see Figure 1.
Gold and oil average yearly prices / data from 1901 to 2011
Graph based on Soares et al. (2011), Chart I.
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Hammes and Wills (2005) hypothesize that after the end of the Bretton Woods accord in 1971, there may 
have been an implicit pegging of oil to the price of gold by oil producers in order to anchor the real value of 
their sales. 
Perhaps oil producers implicitly resumed this peg in the mid-1970s, arguably by adjusting oil production 
according to what produced a reasonably constant gold price of oil. This would add a fundamental rationale 
to the observed empirical relationship. Figure 2 shows how the value of oil in gold was destabilized in the 
mid-1970s, but then stabilized by the end of the 1970s.






























gold begins float at $42 gold at $455
gold rises to $120
oil price at $3.56 oil at $32.56 oil rises to $10.11 
historical relationship between gold and oil
figure 02
Graph based on Hammes and Wills, 2005, Figure 1.
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the essential concepts that enabled financial derivatives markets to flourish
For the US, though, the solution to dealing with floating rates has been the use of financial derivatives. There 
have been two essential concepts that have enabled financial derivatives markets to flourish. The first is 
the use of math to attempt to conquer financial risk. For all financial exposures, one looks for underlying 
risk factors, which can then be aggregated at the portfolio level. These portfolio-level risk factors can 
then be hedged through derivatives. The second concept is the development of appropriate business 
models. Financial derivatives have enabled market participants to choose what type of risk-bearing they will 
specialize in, and which types of risk they can lay off to other risk-bearing specialists.
The following seven mathematical concepts have been useful in managing financial risk: (1) bond math; 
(2) Modern Portfolio Theory; (3) the application of the no arbitrage principle; (4) the Taylor expansion; 
(5) parsimonious modeling techniques; (6) Value-at-Risk; and (7) event-risk measurement. We will briefly 
describe each concept below.
We can dissect bond risk at the security and portfolio level through measuring the relevant 
instrument’s exposure to interest-rate risk. Then with this dissection of interest-rate exposure in a 
bond portfolio, one can decide if any of the various exposures are desirable, and whether any of 
these exposures should be hedged with interest-rate derivatives.
One concept essential for the development of financial hedging instruments is to be able to think 
of portfolios in terms of risk units. This was achieved in the 1950s with Harry Markowitz’s Modern 
Portfolio Theory, which was explained in Elton and Gruber (1997). Markowitz “formulated the 
portfolio problem as a choice of the mean and variance of a portfolio of assets.” An “investor … 
[should] choose his or her preferred portfolio, depending on individual risk-return preferences.” “The 
important message of the theory was that assets could not be selected only on characteristics that 
were unique to the security.” “Rather, an investor has to consider how each security co-moves 
with all other securities.” By “taking these co-movements into account,” one could “construct a 
portfolio that has the same expected return and less risk than a portfolio constructed by ignoring 
the interactions between securities.”
The later development of Value-at-Risk for monitoring a portfolio of diverse derivatives instruments 
was a natural extension to the way of thinking that had begun with Modern Portfolio Theory.
The Use of Math to Conquer Financial Risk
1. Bond math
2. Modern portfolio theory: Thinking in terms of risk units
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The no arbitrage pricing approach, which is summarized in Box 1, was a seminal conceptual 
development for the valuation of derivatives.
Another useful concept is the Taylor expansion; please see Box 2. This formula underlies bond 
duration and convexity as well as all the various Greeks used in option risk measures.
We can apply this approach to both forwards and options. For forwards, the price should equal 
the cost of buying the security and carrying it over to maturity, which, in turn, is equal to the spot 
price plus the cost-of-carry minus the benefits-of-carry. While for options, a dynamic description 
of valuation is required. Essentially one can dynamically replicate the changing value of the option 
on an asset by buying and selling the underlying asset in proportions determined by the option’s 
changing delta. The sum of the profits and losses from this buying-and-selling activity becomes the 
option’s value, once one takes the present value of each of these gains and losses. The option’s 
value cannot deviate from this summation; otherwise, there would be an arbitrage opportunity. 
Black and Scholes came up with a closed-form mathematical equation for this dynamic replication, 
assuming one can continuously carry out this replication over infinitesimally small time intervals.
3. No arbitrage principle for derivatives pricing
3. Taylor expansion
1. Start with a description (model) of the future payoff or price of the underlying asset across 
different possible states of the world.
2. Construct a portfolio of underlying assets that has the same... payoff as the derivative.
3. Set the price of the derivative equal to the value of the replicating portfolio.”
“The no arbitrage pricing or contingent claims pricing approach for valuing a 
derivative proceeds as follows:
‘ ‘
Source: Tsishchanka lecture notes, accessed on 4/9/14
Source: Carpenter (2011), Slide 3.
Box 1
Box 2
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Another key concept is to come up with models for a complex portfolio of securities and derivatives 
using only a handful of factors. In other words, one wants parsimonious models. Then if a portfolio 
can be described by a handful of risk factors, it will be easier to design macro hedges using a 
handful of derivatives for that portfolio.
Vannerem and Iyem (2010) explain that “yield curve dynamics can be described by [three 
parameters: the shift, twist, and butterfly] STB movements. These three movements are the driving 
factors of interest-rates changes across the term structure. They capture between 90 and 98% of 
interest rate variation in most developed markets …”
This type of modeling is an excellent response to Milton Friedman’s 1977 call for an examination 
of “how the whole term structure of yields … [could] be described more compactly by a few 
parameters,” as cited in Nelson and Siegel (1987).
Analogous work has been done in asset allocation with factor models. Factor “models are generally 
classified in three groups: fundamental, statistical, and econometric,” wrote Wolfe (2008).
In Figure 3, Callan Research (2012) provides an illustration of “factors, grouped by type of exposure 
across different categories. … For example, macroeconomic factors are applicable to most asset 
classes while equity and fixed income factors deconstruct characteristics within those two broad 
asset classes.”
As summarized in Vannerem and Iyer (2010):
5. Parsimonious modeling techniques
1. Shift, which captures the changes in the level of the yield curve
2. Twist, which captures the change in the slope of the yield curve
3. Butterfly, which captures the changes in the curvature of the yield curve” 
“The Shift / Twist / Butterfly movements are, in order of importance, as follows:
‘‘
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“Other types of factors include liquidity, leverage and private markets, for which marketable proxies 
are challenging to find. It is possible to reconstitute an asset class from these building blocks. Cash 
would be the combination of real interest rates and inflation. And core bonds would add some of 
the elements that are under the ‘fixed income’ heading. Investors can gain exposure to factors via 
investable proxies, although some factors are easier to access than others,” as explained in Callan 
Research (2012). For our purposes, we note that derivatives enable one to use a factor-modeling 
approach in portfolio construction.
Another crucial mathematical concept for derivatives development is the Value-at-Risk (VaR) 
metric. VaR summarizes the expected worst loss over a target horizon within a confidence interval. 
While VaR is useful, it has to be used jointly with other measures. 
Using long-term data, one can directly examine the worst performance of a derivatives position 
under similar circumstances in the past. In practice, such a measure can sometimes be larger than 
a Value-at-Risk measure based on recent volatility.
6. Value-at-Risk
7. Event risk































illustrative sampling of factors and potential groupings
figure 03
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To illustrate this concept, one example portfolio consisted of a long Russell 2000 vs. a short S&P 
500 futures trade and a long Municipal Bond vs. a short U.S. Bond futures trade. These trades 
were normally unrelated. But during a scenario test of the portfolio’s sensitivity to event risk, which 
is shown in Figure 4, one finds that the combination of the two trades resulted in an exposure to a 
liquidity shock. The short legs of each spread were the more liquid of the pair. Both of these trades 
were at risk to a flight-to-quality event as happened during the Fall of 1998.
One can use event-risk measurements to decide on the appropriate leverage level for a portfolio.
In Part 2, we will finish discussing the essential concepts that enabled financial derivatives markets to 
flourish by covering what the appropriate business models are for commercial participants to successfully 
use financial derivatives. Part 2 will conclude with a discussion of how market participants seem to be once 
again searching out stable valuation benchmarks as an anchor of value rather than exclusively relying on 
financial derivatives for conquering volatile financial risks.
Part II
in the next edition
evaluation of portfolio event risks
EVENT Maximum loss
October 1987 stock market crash -4.11%
Gulf War in 1990 -4.12%
Autumn 1998 bond market debacle -6.42%
Aftermath of September 11 attacks -3.95%
WORST CASE EVENT Maximum loss
Autumn 1998 bond market debacle -6.42%




Source: Till and Eagleeye (2003), Table 5.
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This two-part series is excerpted from a presentation given by the author on February 10th, 2014 at a 
joint meeting in Chicago of the following two professional organizations: the Professional Risk Managers’ 
International Association (PRMIA) and the Chartered Alternative Investment Analyst (CAIA) Association. This 
presentation, in turn, was excerpted from a full-day seminar given by the author to representatives of the 
China Foreign Exchange Trade System, a sub-institution of the People’s Bank of China, in December 2012.
The views expressed in this article are the personal opinions of Hilary Till and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of organizations with which Ms. Till is affiliated. 
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by Edward Thomas Jones
A proposal for identifying actual relationships
Quantitative models are extensively used by financial institutions to describe the relationship between 
the economic environment and, among other things, specific portfolios’ performance, profitability, and 
capital requirements. In addition to helping institutions meet regulatory requirements, such models 
have become an integral part of the risk management and planning decision process. Following the 
economic crisis, however, regulators globally have become increasingly wary of quantitative risk 
models. The use of highly complex models can jeopardise sound risk management to the extent that 
financial institutions place undue reliance on them. Part of this problem is that quantitative models rely 
on historical relationships that might not be correctly specified. This paper introduces the theoretical 
assumptions behind the most common statistical measure of association (i.e. correlation) along with its 
limitations, and proposes an alternative measure which can be used to form the basis of quantitative 
risk models. A working example is provided to highlight how the two different statistical measures can 
yield different conclusions from the same dataset.
Correlation is a popular tool in the financial industry to explain the relationship between the movement 
of financial assets as well as economic data series. Its simplicity allows it to be easily calculated and 
understood by both technical and non-technical individuals within the industry; a correlation value can 
sit anywhere between -1 (perfect negative relationship) and +1 (perfect positive relationship). However, 
correlation is unstable and can be of very limited use (see Pearl, 2000). For example, two equal groups 
from the same dataset (up to one date and beyond that date) could result in very different relationships 
between the series being implied by their correlations. In addition, correlation analysis is only valid for 
stationary series (i.e. those with a mean and variance that don’t change over time; see Alexander and 
Dimitriu (2002) for this condition). This condition usually requires prior de-trending of prices before 
performing correlation analysis, which results in loss of valuable information. De-trending the data 
series before any analysis removes any possibility to detect a common trend and the interpretation of 
the relationship becomes difficult when different approaches are taken to de-trend both series.
introduction
Identifying the true relationship
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An alternative statistical measure to correlation is cointegration. The aim of cointegration is to detect 
any stochastic trends in the series and use these trends for a dynamic analysis of correlation. The main 
advantage of cointegration analysis, as compared to the standard concept of correlation, is that it enables 
the use of the entire information set when the series are non-stationary. Furthermore, a cointegrating 
relationship is able to explain the long-run behaviour of cointegrated series, whereas correlation usually 
lacks stability, because it is a short-run measure of co-dependency. While the amount of historical data 
required to support the cointegrating relationship may be large, the attempt to use the same sample to 
estimate correlation coefficients may face many obstacles such as outliers and volatility clustering. 
Engle and Granger (1987) proposed a simple two-step (residual-based) approach for performing cointegration 
analysis. Other tests for cointegration have been developed, including the Johansen procedure that allows 
the testing of several series (unlike Engle and Granger approach that only test two series). The first step of 
the Engle-Granger approach involves regressing one variable on the other and calculating the residuals. 
The second step involves applying the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test for unit root on the residuals. 
Under the null hypothesis that the series are not cointegrated, the residuals should be non-stationary. 
Rejection of the null is evidence the residual is stationary, i.e. that the series are indeed cointegrated. 
Following its introduction by Engle and Granger, cointegration has grown in popularity by econometricians 
as it allows them to analyse non-stationary variables without the loss of any information. However, its use 
in the financial industry has been limited thus far, mainly due to the fact that the standard in portfolio and 
risk management is the correlation of asset returns. However, these correlations do not always reflect the 
true relationship between series.
The following example considers the relationship between the commodities and financial markets and 
illustrates the different conclusions that can be borne from the two methodologies. There has been a surge 
in the role of commodities within the financial industry over the past decade. The financial returns and 
diversification qualities from commodities have attracted the attention of investors, while financial institutions 
have come to pay particular attention to the asset class given its reflection of real economic activity and a 
major source of inflationary pressures.
Lombardi, et al. (2010) proposed that over the past decade, there has been a remarkable rise in commodity 
prices, which was driven by various factors including the demand from China for raw industrial inputs and 
increase in food consumption. This surge in prices attracted institutional and retail investors to this asset 
class, which further helped drive prices upwards. Further, the money created by the quantitative easing and 
fiscal stimulus of the Central Banks and governments flowed into risk assets, such as commodities and 
equities. The emergence of a ‘risk-on/risk-off’ attitude among investors, in which investors piled in and out 
commodities and financial markets
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of risky assets depending on the latest headline, caused prices to fluctuate depending on market nerves. 
This also resulted in the asset classes beginning to show a strong positive relationship. 
The role of commodities as inputs in the production process suggests that this asset class will share a 
negative relationship with equity prices (where equity prices are a discounted value of future dividends). 
If input prices increases, firms will see their profits decrease, all else being equal, and will therefore have 
less cash to pay out as dividend. This suggests that commodity prices are driven by physical supply and 
demand; however, it is now acknowledged that this is not the case (Kilian, 2009). 
The correlation and cointegration approaches described above provide a framework for determining the 
relationship between commodity and equity prices. Changes in commodity prices over time are captured 
by the S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (SPGSCI). This weighted index is based on the last five 
years average quantity of global production of each commodity. Its diverse composition and coverage of 
all sectors allows it to be used in determining the relationship between commodity and equity prices. The 
S&P 500 (S&P) is one the most commonly followed equity indices and it is considered one of the best 
representation of equities performance. The performance of both indices between 2008 and 2013 is shown 
in Figure 1. 
The performance of the indices differed immediately following the 2007 financial crisis; while the SPGSCI 
continued its trend to reflect the ongoing commodity super cycle, the S&P continued a downward trend 
given the financial turmoil initially observed in 2007. 

















The SAP 500 and S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Index performance post 2007 financial crisis
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After a correction to the SPGSCI trend, both indices showed upward movement having hit their lows in 
early 2009. While the S&P showed a steady upward movement, the SPGSCI showed rapid growth until 
2011 before levelling off to a level not much higher than what it was at the beginning of the period. The 
correlation between the both indices between 2008 and 2013 was 0.72, which would imply a strong 
positive relationship between the S&P 500 and SPGSCI: both commodities and equities move together 
over time. 
The ADF test is used to determine if both series are stationary, which is one of the requirements for 
correlation analysis. Before calculating this test, it is necessary to decide upon the number of lags to be 
included in the tests. Too many lags could increase the error in the forecasts; too few could leave out 
relevant information. By using the Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion, both series are found to have 
a lag of one day. The ADF test was run for both the S&P and SPGSCI with a lag of one day and a trend 
assumed in both series, and both series were found to be non-stationary (i.e. with a unit root). In addition, the 
Mackinnon test shows that both series are integrated of order {(1)}. These results imply that the correlation 
result of 0.72 is unreliable because the series are non-stationary and does not reflect the true relationship 
between commodity and equity prices . Given the non-stationary nature of the series, it would be possible 
to calculate the first differences of the series and then proceed to calculate the correlation on these new 
values if they are found to be stationary; however, this approach would result in a loss of information.
To ensure full use of the available information, cointegration provides a suitable methodology to determine 
the relationship between both non-stationary series. The first step of this approach is to estimate the long-
run equation using OLS regression, with the SPGSCI as the independent variable and the S&P as the 
dependent variable (the decision of the independent/dependent variables is based on the assumption the 
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If the residuals are found to be a stationary process, then the relationship will be cointegrated. Again, the 
ADF test is used to determine if the series has a unit root. The residuals are found to be non-stationary 
and, therefore, commodity and equity prices are not cointegrated; that is, there is no long-run average 
relationship between commodity and equity prices, which contradicts the correlation results. 
 Cointegrated financial assets must be driven by the same underlying factors so that they share a long-
run equilibrium relationship. As no cointegration relationship is found, the result implies that commodity and 
equity prices are, on the whole, driven by different factors over this period that are not related to both. While 
it is not possible to rule out that the flow of money from quantitative easing was a driver of price changes 
in both series, the results also point to assets specific drivers of prices, such as industrial demand for raw 
commodities. An alternative explanation for this non-relationship is that approximately half of the companies 
included in the S&P are currently not reliant on commodities as inputs and, therefore, their profits (and thus, 
their equity price) are not directly impacted by changes in commodity prices.   
Correlation as a measure of relationship is unstable and can lead to incorrect assumptions when developing 
quantitative models for the financial industry. When statistics show that two series are highly correlated, 
then there is a temptation to think of them moving side by side with both series growing together. Similarly, 
highly negative statistical correlation would imply that the series go in opposite directions. Both of these 
assumptions would be incorrect. When developing highly complex quantitative models it is important to 
capture the true nature of the interaction between the underlying series. Incorrectly specified relationships 
can, among other things, endanger sound risk management and cause incorrect decisions to be made 
in the planning process. An alternative measure of relationship is cointegration, which is considered a 
more robust statistical measure given its ability to explain long-run behaviours and make use of the entire 
information set. Incorporating cointegration into the development of quantitative models will ensure that 
historical relationships are correctly specified, thus aiding the accuracy and appropriateness of such 
models. As a final point, any relationships assumed by quantitative models should also be supported by 
business intuition, and not be based on statistical calculations alone regardless of the methodology used.
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Risk attitudes among insurance company management and
implications for forming a Risk Culture
abstract
what culture is not
Culture is not the explanation of last resort
by Alice Underwood, Michael Thompson & David Ingram
all on the same train, but heading in different directions
Insurance company managers are surveyed to discern their alignment with four risk attitudes predicted 
by Plural Rationality Theory. Each company management team is shown to contain a mix of beliefs, 
but not always the same mix. Since each belief is tied to a different expectation for appropriate risk 
management, there are inherent conflicts with a risk management culture that is tied to a single belief. 
The paper concludes with descriptions of hybrid risk management cultures that would have some 
appeal to various pairs of the four beliefs.
Many discussions of ERM include Risk Culture as one important component of a successful ERM 
program. But in some cases, Risk Culture is no more than a term of art to suggest a particular set of 
behaviours accompanied by risk management mission and vision statements. For this discussion, the 
authors will assume that the term refers to how things are seen, done and justified at the various levels 
of the business. That assumption causes us to rule some things out. So, we will start with a statement 
of what the term “culture” does not mean in this paper.
Sometimes “culture” is dragged in only when other explanations – economic, demographic, organisational 
and so on – are inadequate: explanations of the kind “Oh well, it must be cultural then.”
• Evident corporate shortcomings associated with the recent financial crisis are often put 
down to “culture”; hence all the talk about the need for a “change of culture.”
• This line of reasoning has also blossomed, in recent years, in the study of international 
relations: the “world society” literature, for instance, holds that a set of “Western/modern” 
norms have gained global legitimacy, even in regions where it doesn’t make “objective 
economic sense” to adhere to those values.
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Culture is not a veto on comparison
Culture is not the uncaused cause
In understanding Risk Culture, it is not useful to assume that each culture is unique and can only be 
understood in its own terms (as expressed in anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s notion of thick description1). 
For instance, if one ventures a generalization such as that human societies share the notion of up-and-
down, some anthropologist shouts “Not in my tribe!” In recent years, this “hermeneutic” or “post-structural 
view” has taken the social sciences by storm. But as Harry Eckstein observed2, in the absence of any 
attempts to test and compare, thick descriptions are just “very high level travel literature.”
The authors have worked together for almost five years developing articles and papers that describe a 
view of Risk Culture using an adaptation of the work originated by Mary Douglas that is now called Plural 
Rationality Theory3. This framework for discussion of culture relies on two independent and measurable 
dimensions - hierarchy and attachment - which result in four quadrants, linked to four different views of risk 
in the world and four fundamental types of Risk Cultures.
Though often dressed up in impressive swathes of reasoning, and bolstered by extensive statistics, all 
these are not explanations - just elaborate ways of saying “I don’t know.”
This paradigm explains “why did he do that?” with “because his culture told him to.”
1 / Geertz contrasts a factual observation of a man winking with a “thick description” that puts the wink into the context of the culture: e.g. “rapidly contracting his 
right eyelid” vs. “practicing a burlesque of a friend faking a wink to deceive an innocent into thinking conspiracy is in motion.” Geertz, Clifford. “Thick Description: 
Toward an Interpretative Theory of Culture.” In The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books (1973)
3 / The most complete exposition of this work, a compilation of six articles published over four years and titled “Rational Adaptation for ERM in a Changing 
Environment,” was recently published by InsuranceERM, at www.insuranceerm.com.
2 / R. Ellis, M. Thompson. Culture Matters. Westview Press (1997)
• Pointing to “Asian values” is an example of this solecism.
• So too is the “culture wars” thesis (e.g. Samuel Huntingdon) in which the culture-carriers – the 
members of the various blocs: Islamic, Christian and so on – are pitted against one another 
because they are Islamic, Christian etc.
• Likewise with the various proponents of organisational culture – Hofstede, Hampden-Turner, 
Trompenaars – who are so heavily relied-upon in much of the work on Risk Culture.
• Low hierarchy, high attachment: Conservator culture sees the world as dangerously risky, 
requiring a very careful approach to risk taking, and often seeks to minimize risk.
what culture is
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• High hierarchy, high attachment: Manager culture sees the world as moderately risky, and risk 
as something that can be tamed. This culture most closely aligns with the ideas usually put 
forward as ERM.
• Low hierarchy, low attachment: Maximizer culture expects any losses to be recoverable from 
subsequent gains, and accepts risks when compensation (price) is right.
• High hierarchy, low attachment: Pragmatist culture sees unpredictability in the world, and often 
chooses to avoid commitments and over-concentration in any one type of risk.
Traditional ERM tends to tacitly assume that risk management is “best” when a single Risk Culture – the 
Manager culture – is universally adopted. But each of the four Risk Cultures can be found within most 
companies - and, as will be shown in the next section, within most management teams.
Karl Dake developed a survey of risk attitudes in the 1990s and used it as part of a massive research into 
consumer attitudes4. Dake’s survey was adapted by Ingram to take the questions from the household 
domain into the business setting. To date, about 200 insurance executives from eleven companies in the 
insurance sector have completed the survey. Each person’s survey results provide a score between -10 
and +10 for each Risk Culture. A score of 5 or above indicates a preference for that Risk Culture; a score 
of -5 or lower indicates active disagreement. Chart 1 illustrates that individual responses fall into 9 groups.
About half showed a clear preference for one and 
only one of the four cultures. The other half gave 
answers that indicated agreement with two of the 
four cultures.
This chart indicates that ERM in its “purest” form 
would only really appeal to the 17% of respondents 
who indicated a preference for the pure Manager 
culture. However, another 45% of the responses 
(MGR/PRAG, CONS/MGR and MAX/MGR) 
showed some leaning towards the Manager 
culture. This suggests that a form of ERM based 
on the Maximizer/Manager blended Risk Culture 
would get the widest support, aligning directly with 
29.6% and at least partly with approximately 75%.
Chart 1: Distribution of risk preferences for 200 individual survey respondents
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Many Chief Risk Officers describe their job and the objectives of their risk management programs as 
involving collaboration with the business units in support of profitable risk taking, rather than focussing 
solely upon the negative aspects of risk. In fact, a large segment of risk managers advocate redefining 
the word “risk” to include favourable as well as unfavourable variations in outcomes. Apparently they are 
seeking to find aspects of the Maximizer culture to merge into the Manager dominated ERM structure. 
These risk managers have empirically reached the same conclusion as the survey indicated: that they will 
gain the widest acceptance for a risk management program that is a Maximizer / Manager blend.
In order to be effective, a risk management program must be more than “lip service” to an otherwise 
ignored standard5. In other words, for true effectiveness ERM must align with corporate culture. is, then, a 
Maximizer/Manager ERM the “best” sort of ERM?
Not necessarily. To varying degrees, the predominant risk preference differs from company to company. 
The following charts show survey results for each of the eleven companies separately.
Chart 2: Average risk preference by company
4 / See K. Dake and M. Thompson, “Making ends meet, in the household and on the planet.” GeoJournal 47: 417-424 (1999)
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Different shapes indicate different cultural preferences at each company. Companies 3 and 11 have 
preferences that are very much like the overall average, but the other nine companies vary significantly. 
Companies 7 and 9 each show very high agreement with the Manager culture and might do well with 
the “pure” ERM approach. Companies 1, 4, 5, and 11 had significant minorities favouring the Pragmatist 
culture. Companies 3 and 9 have the highest fraction of people favouring the Conservator culture.
Another layer to this puzzle of culture is the issue of who in the company favoured each culture. The results 
differed somewhat by type of position (Chart 3).
Of the four groups, top management contains the highest percentage of Maximizers and the lowest 
percentage of Conservators. When survey results were presented to one management team and it was 
pointed out that no one in the group favoured the Conservator culture, their response was “That would be 
[Joe]; he retired last year and our meetings have had many fewer arguments since then.” 
Board members surveyed had slightly fewer Maximizers and slightly more Conservators. That they would 
have somewhat less appetite for risk than top management is probably appropriate and desirable given 
their respective roles, but the lack of dramatic differences makes sense seeing that board members are 
usually top managers somewhere else. Underwriters and middle management, on the other hand, showed 
a much higher concentration of Conservators. This is clear evidence that the top management ideology 
that populates mission statements and vision statements may not be shared with the middle management 
at a fundamental cultural level. A significant slice of middle management may well see top management’s 
ideology as too aggressive.
Chart 3: Average risk preference by type of position held
Insurer board Insurer underwriters
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Chart 4: Percentage distribution of perceived company strategy by risk area for 21 insurers
Chart 5: Average level of agreement on company strategy among seven management groups
For seven of the eleven companies surveyed for risk preferences, there were six additional questions 
about the management strategy applied for specific areas of risk. The possible answers were designed to 
reference one or another of the four Risk Cultures. The strategies of fourteen additional companies were 
assessed by Willis Re staff; Chart 4 shows the percentages of these 21 insurers that had a strategy tied 
to the approach favoured by one or another of the four Risk Cultures for managing a particular risk area.
Within the seven companies where we had data by individual, we found that there was limited agreement 
about what the actual strategy was for their company (Chart 5).
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This confusion (less than 70% agreement) might be an indication of poor communication among company 
management, but a separate study of eight insurers’ approach to five major categories of risk indicated that 
insurers actually do employ two or more of the distinct risk management strategies that would be preferred 
by one Risk Culture or another6. Only two of these eight insurers favoured the same strategy for all four 
risk types as well as for enterprise-level risks; one had a Conservator strategy for all, and the other had a 
Pragmatist strategy for all (Pragmatist strategy often includes a variety of approaches for managing risks). 
Two of the other six insurers used two distinct risk management strategies, and four used three strategies. 
Both of the two-strategy firms used a Manager approach for some risks and a Pragmatist approach for 
others. Of the four three-strategy firms, two used Manager, Conservator and Pragmatist; the other two 
used Maximizer and Manager, one with Pragmatist and the other with Conservator.
The senior risk officer of one firm divided up the firm’s risks by the variations in risk strategy:
• Natural Catastrophe Risk is managed primarily through diversification of exposures by type of 
natural catastrophe (earthquake, hurricanes and other high wind events and floods) and by 
diversification of locations – a Pragmatist strategy.
• Other Insurance Risks follow a Maximizer strategy: they work hard to make sure that they sell 
the insurance at the right price, and risk is of low concern.
• Operational Risk is managed with a purely Conservator strategy: the company is not paid for 
taking these risks, so they want no more risk of loss than absolutely necessary. They choose 
operational risk controls based upon cost/benefit.
• Management of Credit and Investment Risk splits into two regimes: — Long-term asset allocation 
goals are set with an efficient frontier Manager approach. — Tactical variations on the strategic 
asset allocation goals are based on short-term market outlook: a Maximizer approach.
6 / Unpublished study to be presented at ICA 2014 in Washington DC.
7 / See the article “ERM: Four Ways to do God’s Work” in “Rational Adaptation for ERM in a Changing Environment,” InsuranceERM (2013)
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PRAGMATIST
To moderate the risk profile, insurer seeks to undertake a 
broad range of activities whose risks are unrelated, and 
maintain an appropriate balance among activities; the key 
limit in this risk management system is the concentration 
limit
Constantly monitor major risks, staying alert for any
change that would skew the spread of risk
Periodic rebalancing of investments is a diversification
strategy
No fixed expectation for surplus level, rating, business
growth or usage of reinsurance
Little reliance on models and analytics
Approach to competition varies from year to year and
by situation
Usually have activities in several very different
businesses
Not interested in emerging risks; prefer more tangible
issues
Will try many new opportunities, but may not commit
enough resources
Will experience smaller losses
MANAGER
Top-down risk management process uses an economic 
capital model as key reference point for risk; the key limit 
applied is the amount of economic capital each activity 
generates
ERM systems often used to optimize the risk portfolio by
calculating the best opportunities
ERM integrated with planning cycle will include capital
budgeting process, incorporating capital requirements 
and expected return on capital for planned future 
business
Expect their business to grow at about the same rate as 
the market in general
Incentive system tied to risk-adjusted financial results
Expect to hold capital at a level determined by internal 
model
Will set a target for company credit rating and 
painstakingly work to fulfil rating agency expectations
Calculate the exact benefits of diversification
Interested in emerging risk but not typically skilled in 
dealing with the level of uncertainty involved
May miss new opportunities while analysing; may be a 
fast follower. Will experience moderate losses in poor 
environment.
Importance of a person in the company depends on how 
many people work for them
The four risk preferences can be aligned with four risk management strategies7. But, applying the idea of 
Plural Rationality, many other aspects of Risk Culture emerge. The following table gives a brief outline of 
some aspects of the four cultures. As mentioned several times, the Manager culture is a fairly tight match 
with “textbook” ERM Risk Culture.
risk cultures
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MAXIMIZER
Focus on the valuation/pricing of risk, applied on a
transaction by-transaction basis
Insurers focus on combined ratio
May use economic capital and a cost-of-capital
approach to standardise pricing risk margins
Establish risk limits related to the amount prices may
deviate from “standard” by-the-book rates
Tend to hold the minimum capital needed to keep the
lowest rating that customers/distributors will tolerate
Expect to grow significantly faster than the market;
achieve high profit growth in the right environment
Low reliance on quantitative analysis, except for
pricing
Tend to concentrate as much business as possible in
the most profitable segments
Not concerned about emerging risks before they
emerge
High interest in competitors; seek to win
Highly interested in taking up new opportunities; not a
follower
Experience larger losses in unfavourable
environments
CONSERVATOR
Seek to restrict exposure to potential losses or risks
Emphasize the internal audit function and other ways of
controlling operational risks, careful risk underwriting and 
tight exposure limits
Non-underwriting risks (e.g. interest rate and equity
exposures) typically managed via asset-liability matching 
and hedging, often operated with a zero loss target
Often emphasize stress tests to help prepare for the 
worst-case situation
Not highly concerned with growth; often accept below-
market growth
Spend significant resources preparing for emerging risks
Rarely take up new opportunities; may finally try a new
business right at the peak, and then suffer decline of 
profits and growth
Experience smaller losses in unfavourable environments
Flat organization chart; tend to have many large meetings
where everyone gets a say
risk cultures
Just as there are hybrid risk preferences, there can be hybrid Risk Cultures. Through the boom times 
leading up to the financial crisis, many CROs found that their role was to facilitate business, not to be the 
“Doctor No” of the company. They adopted a hybrid of Manager and Maximizer approaches as the ERM 
program.
hybrid cultures
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The statistics on the insurance executives surveyed suggest that a Manager/Maximizer hybrid should fit 
with most management teams. However, in different times or with different management teams, Manager/
Conservator or Manager/Pragmatist hybrids might be more successful. Looking at Chart 2, at least one 
management group (Company 4) would probably prefer the Manager/Pragmatist blend. In addition, there 
are situations where circumstances force management’s hand, regardless of preference. One company in 
our study had experienced a major loss, and ran under a Conservator/Manager hybrid for five years until 
the firm worked its way out of the consequences of their loss – even though not a single person on the 
management team favoured the Conservator Risk Culture.
Based upon the sample evidence, it seems reasonable to tentatively conclude that a “pure” ERM approach, 
strictly aligned with the Manager Risk Culture, is probably not going to suit most insurers’ leadership. Nor 
will it match up with most risk management strategies currently in place.
The above discussion of risk preferences provides a starting point for thinking about Risk Culture in a way 
that is not simply “black/white, on/off.” Almost all companies will find each of these four risk preferences 
within their staff, and most within their management team. To develop a successful Risk Culture for the firm, 
this possibility should be an important consideration.
conclusion
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by Daniel Melo
managing risk and hitting your objectives, with analytics 
in the cloud 
Cloud services are democratizing access to Big Data analytics, optimization and decision management. 
Rapid application development (RAD) and cloud-based community marketplaces are changing the way 
we think about analytic investment. Banks can leverage these technologies to quickly turn insights into 
better operational decisions and turn traditional champion-challenger testing into a learning dynamo 
that drives continuous improvement. 
In the quest to grow responsibly while managing risk, and stand out in a competitive marketplace by 
providing superior service to customers, a handful of financial services companies are rising above the 
rest. The top performers are leveraging state-of-the-art analytics in ways that distinguish them from the 
pack. These companies have invested heavily in Big Data analytics and real-time decision management 
to better understand consumer behavior and its context; not just what is happening, but why. They’re 
using this deeper insight to act with ever-greater speed, relevance and value to customers.
Financial institutions face a shifting, complicated risk management landscape. There may be new 
regulations put in place that require updated forms of compliance management, model management, 
or stress testing. There may be new data that has to be incorporated into decision making, or there 
may be new reporting requirements. There may be new schemes dreamt up by criminals to defraud 
consumers. Collections and recovery alone is a risk-management endeavor fraught with customer 
service minefields. Purchasing and installing hardware to address such challenges puts a strain on 
internal IT resources, and carries a steep price tag.
That’s why the cloud is fast becoming a very attractive technology platform for banks. Proper use of 
analytics in the cloud can help banks efficiently and effectively make risk-based decisions related to, 
for example, loan originations, account management, and loan portfolio management. Not only is it 
often cheaper and faster to deploy systems in the cloud than in traditional IT environments, it is flexible 
and conducive to innovation because everything can be updated instantly, as-needed.
abstract
byline
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The cloud gives banks a more streamlined risk-management environment. This, in turn, often translates 
into more capacity to process more loans, greater agility to rapidly comply with new regulations, the 
ability to easily model numerous scenarios and test portfolios under many conditions (and then implement 
appropriate changes quickly), and the cloud ensures that a bank always has access to the latest version of 
their preferred risk-management software.
Automated, intelligent communications is at the heart of how top analytic performers work and interact 
with customers. Analytically driven insights can trigger decisions, which trigger actions that are executed 
via omni-channel strategies, and these can deliver a seamless customer experience. The cloud makes 
these solutions easier to implement for a larger universe of institutions by dramatically lowering the cost of 
deployment.
For one European bank, 78 percent of customers receiving automated communications said it improved 
the overall level of service they were experiencing. The bank also saw a 23 percent rise in ticket value per 
debit card spend. A retail finance company also using automated communications for collections increased 
right-party contacts by 42 percent and immediate payments by 30 percent.
Deciding the appropriate time to contact customers is sometimes a difficult choice, especially for sensitive 
situations like collections and recovery, but with smart communications based on analytics it doesn’t have 
to be awkward. Many businesses assume that customers will not respond to communications outside of 
normal working hours or via ‘unusual methods’, but in today’s hyper-connected world, that is no longer the 
case. 
Black Horse, part of the Lloyds Banking Group, now uses a combination of interactive SMS texts and 
automated payment capture, so that its customers can easily pay overdue debts. Black Horse customers 
who have not paid by their due date receive an SMS, which includes the option for the customer to request 
an immediate call back, or for them to make a payment using an autopay facility. This approach has 
increased the amount paid per plan by 25 percent, and the number of successful payment arrangements 
with overdue customers by an impressive 9 percent.
There are fraud-management implications as well. For example, most banks currently call customers to 
check on a suspicious pattern in credit card charges. However, top performers are carrying out more 
multifaceted communications that can now be implemented within reasonable budget parameters thanks 
to the cloud, such as sending automated SMS or email messages if a transaction is out of pattern. New 
cloud-based technology enables card issuers to automatically check every suspicious transaction to 
see whether the POS is in the same location as the cardholder’s mobile phone. Such proximity-smart 
technology allows the cardholder to verify legitimacy quickly and without embarrassment or fuss. If fraud is 
underway, banks can provide automated resolution or the option for human agent assistance.
analytics pinpointing delinquency
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Industry leaders have implemented the infrastructure and technologies to analyze huge volumes and wide 
varieties of data, but the cloud makes Big Data infrastructure available as a service on a consumption or 
subscription basis. Any organization across the globe can rapidly harness the processing power required 
for a new initiative in customer centricity, scaling up with growth. A  wide variety of analytic technologies are 
also available, including machine learning algorithms for automated data mining, text and speech analytics, 
predictive models, and economic impact models.
There is far less expense and risk involved in trying new ways to solve business problems and deliver 
better service to customers in the cloud. Cloud-based analytics enable virtually any organization to deploy 
solutions at a cost that’s up to 80 percent less than comparable solutions in traditional environments. 
Correctly coupled, these tools are focused on creating applications that have analytics-driven decisioning 
at their core. They include domain-specific application frameworks with libraries of predictive customer 
characteristics, extensible data models, process templates and rapidly adaptable user interfaces. The 
cloud also makes it easier to share learning and replicate successes across organizations, raising return on 
investments. Moreover, organizations may be able to monetize their work by making it available for fellow 
cloud participants.
Banks should always look for ways to deepen insights and improve employees’ perception of customer 
behavioral context. This can be achieved by analyzing existing data in new ways. For example, a time-
to-event model can examine time log data from point-of-sale systems to predict how likely a customer 
behavior is to occur within a specified period of time. The cloud provides access to this and many other 
analytic technologies and makes it easier for all organizations to tap into new data sources. For one of our 
clients, analyzing text and combining the insights extracted from it with insights from traditional structured 
data improved predictive model performance by 8 percent. 
As analytics pull context and meaning from incoming data streams, analytic experts can bring this intelligence 
immediately to bear on operational decisions, and therefore boost efficiency and, hopefully, profitability. To 
enhance this process, they’re increasingly embedding analytic decision making into all their customer-
facing applications, and cloud analytics provide access to domain-specific applications with embedded 
decisioning. Or, cloud users can tap into decision engines that will execute virtually any combination of 
analytic models and business rules to perform decision services for other applications, including legacy 
systems. 
efficiencies and opportunities
driving intelligent actions from big data insights
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By leveraging cloud-based analytics, banks can ensure consistent customer treatment, even if that treatment 
is ultimately delivered through diverse, distributed customer touchpoints and legacy applications. The cloud 
allows critical decisions to be centralized and coordinated, even when customer interfaces are distributed 
and minimally connected.
A key benefit of cloud-based analytics is that banks can mathematically ascertain the best win-win situation 
for themselves and their customers. Increasingly, industry leaders are employing decision modeling with 
mathematical optimization to identify the best strategy for achieving a goal, such as maximizing profit, while 
balancing multiple objectives and constraints (time, budget, physical capacity, human resources, etc.). The 
cloud provides access to optimization engines and decision modeling templates, which clearly show the 
impact of optimization. Performance improvements across a wide range of decisioning use cases—new 
account originations, marketing, collections—are generally 15 to 20 percent.
One bank that has developed an “optimization culture” has encountered great success from driving round 
after round of improvement in its credit-line management strategies. The initial round of optimization 
sent incremental profit per account up by more than $7 within 12 months of execution. The latest round 
has already raised it by $5 per account after just four months. The bank is also applying optimization to 
collections and settlement decisions, as well as to pricing. 
An online European bank that needed to fully exploit the cost advantages of being an online-only bank 
used a cloud-based originations solution to implement lean, automated processes that put control over 
lending policies in the hands of the bank’s business users. The system also incorporates parameter-based 
functions that make the process of adapting to conditions in new regional markets largely automatic, which 
just shows what can be achieved with cloud-based solutions.
Customer expectations for products and services are being set by a handful of leaders who have invested 
heavily in analytics-driven decision management. Increasingly, customers simply take it for granted that 
banks know what they want, and are acting in accordance with individual customer needs. Cloud-based 
analytics allow any bank to meet these expectations.
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PRM candidate of the year
by Janet Tritch
PRMIA has named Ewelina Zajac with BRE Bank in Poland as the 2013 PRM™ Candidate of the Year 
winner. Vidmantas Kniuksta, Senior Analyst at SEB Bank in Lithuania, was named the 2013 PRM™ 
Cross-Over Candidate of the Year recipient.
This award program annually recognizes top Professional Risk Manager (PRM™) candidates from 
around the world. The PRM designation program, comprised of four exams, is the global standard for 
the world’s top financial risk professionals, having received public endorsements from both business 
and universities. A PRM assures that the holder has the required broad knowledge and understanding, 
qualitative and quantitative, that risk managers must bring to the job.
Ms. Zajac’s and Mr. Kniuksta’s PRM exam scores were the highest of all PRMIA members who earned 
their PRM designation between January 1 – December 31, 2013, qualifying them for the distinction 
of 2013 Candidates of the Year. Mr. Kniuksta obtained his PRM by passing Exams I, II, and III, along 
with the Associate PRM exam, which is recognized as a cross-over exemption for PRM Exam IV. This 
qualifies him as the PRM Cross-Over Candidate of the Year.
PRMIA is also pleased to name Andy Ford, Investment Director at Standard Life Investments in Scotland, 
as its 2013 Associate PRM Focus Award recipient. Mr. Ford achieved the top score of the year on the 
Associate PRM exam during 2013. The Associate PRM is a PRMIA certificate program intended for 
staff entering the risk management profession, or those who interface with risk management disciplines 
on a regular basis, such as auditing, accounting, legal, and systems development personnel who want 
to understand fundamental risk management methods and practices.
here are this year’s winners
Ewelina Zajac Vidmantas Kniuksta Andy Ford
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STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 
 Promote the financial services sector on national
and international levels through an International
Risk Management Challenge hosted in Minneapolis,
MN in 2015 
 Develop analytical and decision-making skills of
future leaders from universities across Canada, 
US and EU
 Identify top talent amongst competitors for 
potential employment opportunities
 Create networking opportunities for students 
interested in pursuing risk careers 
 Understand both hard and soft skills required to
work in both IT and Enterprise functional areas 
 Understand strategic importance of risk manage-
ment by aligning analysis to strategic direction 
2014 PARTICIPANT OVERVIEW
 92 teams, 344 competitors, 38 schools, and $9,200
prize for the international championship team!
HOW IS THE COMPETITION
STRUCTURED?
The Challenge begins in early January with the
Preliminary Round, which is conducted online. The top
teams from that round are chosen to advance to the
Regional competitions which will take place in:
�New York  �Chicago  
�London  �Vancouver  
�Toronto  �Montreal  
�Ireland  
The winners of the Regional Round will then travel 
to Minneapolis, Minnesota to compete in the
International Championship round of competition 
on March 6, 2015. One winning team will be chosen
and will win up to a US $10,000 cash award.
REGISTRATION
Teams of three to four members must register together
with the nearest local participating chapter. All team
submissions are evaluated on their approach to their
cases and, if successful, are chosen to enter the
regional and national finals.
To register your team, visit www.prmia.org/prmc and
select your local participating chapter. The registration
fee is US $100 per team. The registration deadline is
December 24, 2014.
The Professional Risk Managers’ International
Association (PRMIA) is hosting the international
PRMIA Risk Management Challenge (PRMC) in
2015 across Canada, the US and the EU. Each
location will host a preliminary Regional
Challenge, and the winners for each location will
convene in Minneapolis, MN in early 2015 for an
International Challenge. 
The PRMIA Risk Management Challenge pro-
vides undergraduate and graduate students from
multiple disciplines the opportunity to solve real-
istic business problems with a risk management
focus.  This year, participants will be given two
case studies that will simulate up-to-date and
real-life risk management challenges. Ultimately,
the PRMC aims to develop and strengthen pro-
fessional and social relationships across stu-





Imperial College Business School, MSc Risk
Management and Financial Engineering
“The PRMIA Risk Management Challenge marked a turning
point in my professional development having blurred the 
distinction between theory and practice. It gave me a flavour of
how various difficulties arising in a company might be addressed.
Being exposed to real-life cases that are still much talked about
provided a great opportunity to deepen my knowledge in the
risk sphere as well as sharpen my strategic thinking. I managed
to learn from high-profile industry practitioners and share my
ideas with peers who are as curious and ambitious as I am. I
believe this challenge is a must for those who are eager to get
closer to the financial world, are not afraid to challenge them-



























PRMIA Awards - 2013 Higher Standard Award
with David Rowe
We are pleased to announce that Dr. David Rowe has been chosen as the winner of the 2013 PRMIA 
Higher Standard Award. This prestigious award is granted to an individual who has significantly impacted 
the global practice of risk management, provided a substantial contribution to the mission of PRMIA 
and its members, and shows an ongoing commitment to the highest standards of the profession. Dr. 
Rowe now joins the list of previous respected winners, including Dr. Colin Lawrence, Dr. Dan Rodriguez, 
Prof. John Hull, David R. Koenig, Prof Carol Alexander, and Prof. Robert Merton.
Dr. Rowe is currently the Senior Strategist for Risk and Regulation with Misys in London. Before joining 
Misys, Dr. Rowe founded and ran his own risk management consulting firm, David M. Rowe Risk 
Advisory, and served as a Senior Advisor to Kamakura Corporation.  Prior to forming his own firm he 
spent eleven years with SunGard, most recently as Executive Vice President for Risk Management.  
Earlier in his career Dr. Rowe spent more than 25 years in the banking and economic forecasting 
industries. He is a frequent contributor to Risk magazine, where he has written the monthly Risk 
Analysis column since late 1999, and has appeared at numerous conferences and seminars over the 
past 20 years. 
We asked Dr. Rowe about his motivations and his contributions to PRMIA and industry activities.
I served on the original PRMIA Blue Ribbon Panel in the early days of the organization’s history and 
later was on the Board for three years. More recently I have been serving on the Finance Committee 
where I helped design and implement more transparent financial reports. This particularly involved 
development of detailed year-to-date budget estimates based on known structural circumstances 
(for example the dates when certain irregular expenses fall due and are paid) as well as the monthly 
pattern of past financial performance.  This provides an effective benchmark against which to compare 
year-to-date actual figures and is the basis for calculating meaningful Y-T-D financial variances.  Such 
information helps empower the Board to meet its governance responsibilities.
I also am serving on the PRMIA C-Suite Committee, and I chaired the first PRMIA CRO breakfast 
roundtable discussion in London this past May.
Can you tell us about your involvement with PRMIA and the risk management industry?
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Why have you decided to take such an active role both in PRMIA and in the risk community? Are 
there any of PRMIA’s initiatives to which you are especially committed?
One of the great things about our profession is that risk managers decided a long time ago that good 
practices are a public good. One firm is better off, not worse off, if its customers and even its competitors 
have sound risk management practices. This has fostered a spirit of sharing insights and techniques that 
goes all the way back to the mid-1980s when risk management began to emerge as a distinct profession 
in its own right.  
I am especially delighted at how the Internet and audio/visual technology has allowed such sharing to 
go global. This enables colleagues in remote locations, who have limited opportunities to see leading 
practitioners in person, to watch presentations and seminars over the web both live and through video 
streaming. Being the source for such material is a very important contribution that PRMIA makes to the risk 
management profession and is an essential part of meeting its commitment to being a truly “International 
Association”.
As the winner of this year’s award, you were given the opportunity to select a student in the field 
of risk management to receive an award of US$1,000 to be donated by PRMIA to the school of the 
student’s choice for further education for the student. Who did you select to receive this award?
Under the guidance and recommendation of the Economics department at Carleton College, my alma 
mater, Ben Huang was named the recipient of this year’s Higher Standard Award scholarship. 
Ben is a senior Economics major at Carleton and is currently a summer analyst in Piper Jaffray’s investment 
banking division. He will pursue a career in investment banking upon graduation. 
Ben shares his thoughts on receiving the scholarship, “I honestly could not be more honored to receive 
this award. I think what PRMIA stands for is important, and to be nominated by the Carleton economics 
department truly means a lot to me. Looking back at what has happened during the past decade in the 
banking industry, I know how important it is to make risk management a part of the banking system. 
Organizations like PRMIA are critical to students as a source of career support and potential employment.”
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London C-Suite Roundtable
On May 15, PRMIA hosted its first C-Suite Roundtable in a recent series of the program – held for 
nearly 15 CROs in London. The PRMIA C Suite Roundtable took place at the Accenture offices in 
London on May 15, 2014 from 730A – 10A GMT. David Rowe, Senior Strategist, Risk and Regulation 
at Misys was the moderator of the event.
The  following attendees were present: Diane Cote, Herve Geny, Jose Morago, Markus Krebsz, Peter 
Hughes, Colin Lawrence, Kathryn Kerle, Moorad Choudhry, Bob Stribling, David Rowe (Moderator), Peter 
Bradshaw, Ashley Davies, Andrew Collingsworth, Paul Lawton, Justin McCarthy (PRMIA Vice-Chair), 
Kevin M. Cuff (PRMIA Executive Director), Alex Voicu (PRMIA Staff), Andy Condurache (PRMIA Staff).
 
Justin McCarthy, PRMIA Vice-Chair of the Board and PRMIA C-Suite Committee Chair provided 
introductory remarks and introduced Dr. David Rowe as the moderator for the morning’s discussion. 
 
David serves PRMIA in multiple capacities, from the Finance Committee to the C-Suite Committee. He is 
a former member of the Board of Directors. David recently received the PRMIA Higher Standard Award 
for outstanding contribution – PRMIA’s highest volunteer award. 
The conversation was centered around the development of risk management, using stress testing and 
scenario analysis on enterprise-wide exposure being a requirement in today’s uncertain economy. 
The following broad topics were included in the course of the regulatory discussion:
• Is the increase of bank regulatory requirements resulting in greater systemic threats from non-
bank financial institutions?
• Is the fundamental problem that banks are “Too Big to Fail”, or are the biggest banks really “Too 
Big to (Risk) Manage”?
• Shortcomings of professional institutional management have contributed to the wave of new 
regulations.  Rightly or wrongly, the general public and politicians believe that large organizations 
are poorly managed.
• Despite recognized technical shortcomings, many issues are more about leadership and culture.
• The size of a bank’s balance sheet does not necessarily translate into more effective management 
or the best understanding of a compliance culture to deal with the overall regulatory environment.
Kevin Cuff & David Rowe
062 Intelligent Risk - August, 2014 
David and Kevin Cuff concluded remarks by expressing great appreciation for Accenture’s hosting and 
supporting the event. All of the attendees felt a worthwhile expression for the opportunity to collaborate 
outside of the constraints of the corporate office. The entire group was unanimous in support of working 
toward another discussion before the end of the calendar year. PRMIA concluded that a full effort 
would be explored to host an additional event in London in 2014 and to look for a calendar of events 
(quarterly) to be hosted throughout 2015 and beyond.
The following broad topics were included in the course of the technology discussion:
The following broad topics were included in the discussion of the landscape of geopolitical 
strife/ political integration around the euro-zone and elsewhere:
• The complexity of controls inevitably leads to greater reliance on technology.
• Technology can support decision making and help institutions comply with complex 
regulatory requirements, but it cannot replace a healthy and pervasive risk culture throughout 
an organization.
• Making institutional data more transparent and searchable is essential to improved flexibility 
and adaptability of risk management.  What is needed is the means to bring analysis to bear 
reliably and quickly to address new questions as they emerge.
• Scotland independence – future of the Eurozone
• Ukraine & Russia
• China
• Increased regulations reflect a view on the part of regulators, politicians and the general public 
that there have been systemic failures in risk management.
PRMIA’s C-Suite program and roundtable discussions are closed-door, Chatham House Rule 
(comments are not to be attributed to specific participants outside the attendees) discussions that will 
focus on ways and strategies to address:
• The accelerated compliance demands of multi-disciplined businesses and the costs 
associated with growing regulatory requirements;
• The importance of technology, data integration and flexible analytics for supporting 
enterprise-wide risk decisions;
• The changing economic landscape of geopolitical strife in the Ukraine, a possible renewed 
upheaval in the Eurozone, etc. as a backdrop of today’s economy. 
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accredited university profile
Imperial College Business School
MSc Risk Management & Financial Engineering
Imperial College London is ranked in the top 10 universities globally. The Business School is a core part 
of the College, which is reflected in the high standard of teaching and research. It is among just 1% of 
business schools worldwide to have achieved accreditation from AMBA, AACSB and EQUIS, in recognition 
of the excellence of its degree programmes and proving our position as one of the world’s most elite 
business schools.
Imperial is situated at the very heart of cultural London and close to the City, the capital’s financial and 
business hub. This proximity offers students at the Business School a unique opportunity to visit and learn 
from leading global organisations, with the added advantage of attracting numerous guest speakers from 
industry.  Students are regularly exposed to working professionals and alumni within all the top financial 
institutions, encouraging networking to raise their awareness of career options and company cultures.  One 
example is the Finance Industry Careers Course which takes place at the start of MSc Risk Management 
and Financial Engineering and includes careers workshops and guest speakers from investment banks, 
asset management firms and other financial services companies.
The Business School provides a dedicated careers team for the exclusive use of its Master’s students. They 
work with students to help identify career and professional goals, and equip them with the tools to achieve 
them. The Business School also takes an integrated approach to career development by strategically 
incorporating careers training into the MSc programme timetable.
Now celebrating its 10th anniversary, the MSc Risk Management & Financial Engineering programme 
is a highly quantitative programme tailored to high-calibre and technically-minded graduates wanting a 
deeper, more analytical study of risk management and financial engineering than is found in general finance 
programmes.
This one year, full-time programme is taught by a combination of our outstanding faculty and industry 
practitioners from the City, providing a good mix of the latest research findings from the Business School’s 
Risk Management Lab and unique industry developments from professionals working in the field.
This one-year programme, accredited by PRMIA, ensures students benefit from a unique blend of rigour 
and relevance, providing graduates with the quantitative and practical skills required for a successful career 
in the hugely competitive, yet rewarding sector of financial services. 
author
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accredited university profile
Université Laval, a major university
Since its founding, Université Laval has been training, equipping, and guiding the decision makers who’ve 
grappled with the major issues of society. Through the advancement and sharing of knowledge, its 
culture of excellence, and its global outlook, our academic community contributes to the development 
and international profile of our province. Still today, with the world at a crossroads, Université Laval plays 
a bigger role than ever in Québec City and on the national and international scene, both as a catalyst for 
change and a visionary institution where knowledge, curiosity, and innovation are part of everyday life. 
Faculté des sciences de l’administration, Université Laval
Located in one of North America’s most vibrant and historic French-speaking cities, FSA ULaval is leading 
the way towards a new concept for business administration, as Québec’s unique position combines 
international flair with proximity to major centres of innovation. 
Choosing to study in business administration at Canada’s oldest university means access to the world’s 
most elite certifications—including AACSB International and EQUIS—as well as a study in world-class 
programs. FSA ULaval’s large and experienced faculty will also give you the skills to drive the expansion of 
ethical and sustainable businesses around the globe with courses taught in both French and English.
From the diversity, history, and dynamism of Québec City to new frontiers abroad, the world of business is 
yours to discover.
MBA in Finance
Manufacturing and financial companies look for managers who can meet the challenges of the globalization 
of trade, the risk of international operations, the multiplication of forms of financial securities and who can 
adapt to the ongoing challenges in finance.
The MBA in finance from FSA ULaval is recognized by and prepares for the CFA Institute exams allowing 
access to the CFA professional title.
This 45-credit program includes applied courses often based on real case studies, an integrative essay and 
the CFA Institute exam preparation.
Professional M.Sc. in Finance
Recognized by the CFA Institute, the professional M.Sc. in Finance prepares students to develop complex 
financial strategies that will help decision-making in a context of uncertainty in risk management, investment 
and portfolio management. Students will also develop their expertise in the field of financial planning, 
investment and corporate mergers.
This 45-credit program is primarily intended for persons who hold a bachelor’s degree or an equivalent degree 
in one of the following areas: Business administration, science (actuarial science, geology, mathematics, 
informatics, physics, statistics), engineering, economics or a related field.
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learning opportunities
In the current environment risk education is not just a choice, it is a necessity.
Since the global recession began in 2008 the demand for risk management training has dramatically 
increased at all levels. In response, our training is evolving in line with member needs. PRMIA recognizes the 
diversity in this renewed demand and has responded by providing a library of risk education tools, delivered 
in brief via online and webbased training solutions, as well as through live classroom and customized in-
house training. All platforms are created and delivered by leading industry experts. Watch your e-mail and 
check the website for current training schedules.
MANAGING ENTERPRISE RISK IN A NEW ENVIRONMENT
Offered jointly by PRMIA & Kellogg School of Management
Chicago / October 2-3, 2014, 8:30 A.M. - 5:30 P.M.
More details here
ADVANCED PRACTICE OF OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT FOR THE FINANCIAL SERVICES
Featuring Ariane Chapelle
Munich / October 13-14, 2014, 9:00 A.M. – 5:00 P.M.
More details here
MODEL RISK
Featuring Vijay Krishnaswamy and Laurent Chauvet
London / November 7, 2014, 9:00 A.M. – 5:00 P.M.
More details here
ADVANCED FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT
Offered jointly by PRMIA & Fordham University
New York / November 12-14, 2014, 9:00 A.M. - 5:30 P.M. 
More details here
OPERATIONAL RISK MASTER CLASS: MEASUREMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND LEADERSHIP
Featuring Russell Walker
New York / December 8-9, 2014, 8:30 A.M. – 5:30 P.M. 
More details here
UPCOMING OPEN ENROLLMENT COURSES
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submission guidelines
Article submissions for future issues of Intelligent Risk are actively invited. Articles should be approximately 1,000–1,500 words, 
single spaced, and cover a topic of interest to PRMIA members. Please consult the submission guidelines located at the end of 
the publication prior to submitting your article. Please send all article submissions that you wish to be considered for publication to 
iRisk@prmia.org. Chosen pieces will be featured in future issues of iRisk, archived on PRMIA.org, and promoted throughout the 
PRMIA. community.
Please follow these recommendations in the interests of meeting PRMIA’s publication standards, and to accelerate both the 
evaluation and editorial process. The review process will take up to 4-8 weeks. The author will receive articles due for revision, as 
well as those while accepted, departs in large part from these guidelines. 
Finally, PRMIA reserves the right to return to an author for reformatting purposes, any article, which is accepted for publication 
that deviates from the aforementioned standards. The editors always reserve the right to make further changes to your work for 
consistency and coherence.
Article Submission - Please send all article submissions that 
you wish to be considered for publication to iRisk@prmia.org
File Format - Please prepare your work using Microsoft Word, 
with any images inserted as objects into the document prior 
to submission.
Abstract - Please present a brief summary or abstract of the 
paper on the page following the title page.
Author Biography - Please include a biography, not exceeding 
150 words, for each of the contributing authors listed. All 
biographies must be included at the end of the article. 
Author Photo - Please provide a professional photograph to 
be included with your article. The photo must be submitted as 
a separate file in jpeg or tiff format. 
Exhibits - Remember to attach all elements relevant to the 
paper (tables, graphs, charts and photos) on separate and 
individual pages at the end of the article. Please denote all 
tabular and graphical materials as Exhibits, and designate 
them using Arabic numerals, successively in order of 
appearance in the text. 
Exhibit Presentation - Please ensure that tables and other 
supplementary materials are organized and presented 
consistently throughout the paper, because they will be 
published as is. You may submit exhibits produced either in 
color or black and white. Use the exact same language in 
consecutive appearances; indicate all bold-faced or italicized 
entries in exhibits; arrange numbers consistently by decimal 
points; use the same number of decimal points for the same 
types of numbers; center headings, columns, and numbers 
correctly; and incorporate any source notes when required. 
Consistency of fonts, capitalization, and abbreviations in 
graphs throughout the paper is required, and all axes and 
lines in graphs must be labeled in a consistent and coherent 
manner. Paste all graphs into Word documents as objects, 
and not as images, allowing access to the original graph. 
Please supply source materials for graphs such as Excel files.
Equations - Please present equations on separate lines. All 
equations must be aligned with the paragraph indents, but 
not followed by any punctuation. Use Arabic numerals at 
the right-hand margin to number equations consecutively 
throughout the article. Use brackets to indicate all operation 
signs, Greek letters, or other such notations that may be 
ambiguous. 
Reference Citations - In-text citations of authors and works 
must be represented as: Smith (2000). Use parenthesis for the 
year, not brackets. Similarly, references within parentheses 
must be represented as: “(see also Smith, 2000).”
References List - A reference is a source that is actually cited 
in the text. Please formally list only articles previously cited, 
using a separate alphabetical references list at the end of the 
article. 
Author Guidelines - PRMIA categorically values literary 
excellence in selecting articles for publication. To enhance 
clarity and coherence, we urge the use of simple sentences 
comprising of a minimal number of syllables per word.
 
Follow these instructions regarding the format of your articles and references. 
I-RISK SUBMISSION GUIDELINES
CALL FOR ARTICLES
067Intelligent Risk - August, 2014 
INTELLIGENT RISK
knowledge for the PRMIA community
©2014 - All Rights Reserved
Professional Risk Managers’ International Association
